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A CLOSE LOOK AT ADEA MIXED-MOTIVES
CLAIMS AND GROSS v. FBL FINANCIAL
SER VICES, INC.
Leigh A. Van Ostrand*
In Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court held
that a plaintiff bringing a claim for disparate treatment under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) could not shift the burden of
persuasion to the defendant, even after the plaintiff had established that age
was a motivating factor in the defendant's adverse employment decision.
Prior to Gross, ADEA plaintiffs had two available frameworks to prove
claims for intentional age discrimination: the three-prong McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green framework that creates an inference of
discrimination using a prima facie case, and the burden-shifting, "mixed-
motives" analysis laid out in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, which the Gross
Court rejected for ADEA plaintiffs. This Note urges Congress to intervene
and amend the ADEA to be consistent with the burden-shifting framework
codified in § 107 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. This Note explores the
purposes behind the ADEA, including its relationship with Title VII, and
looks at Supreme Court cases that shaped the analysis of disparate
treatment discrimination claims prior to Gross. This Note explores the
majority and dissenting opinions in Gross and how subsequent courts have
treated ADEA cases in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision.
Ultimately, this Note concludes that Gross does not necessarily alter the
McDonnell Douglas framework for ADEA plaintiffs, but that Congress
should step in and amend the ADEA so that plaintiffs may bring mixed-
motives claims. If Congress were to amend the ADEA in this way, the
causation standards under Title VII and the ADEA would be identical and
the ADEA 's goals of deterring discrimination and compensating victims
would be fulfilled.
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2006, Boston College. I
would like to thank my advisor, Professor Robert Kaczorowski, for his invaluable guidance
and patience, and my family and friends for their constant encouragement and support
throughout this process.
FORDHAMLAWREVIEW
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IN TRO D UCTION .......................................................................................... 40 1
I. THE ADEA AND TITLE V II ................................................................... 404
A. Purpose and Reasoning Behind Enacting the ADEA ............... 404
B. Title VII and the ADEA ............................................................. 406
C. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and Seminal Supreme Court
Cases That Shaped the Analysis of ADEA and Title VII
Disparate Treatment Claims ................................................... 408
1. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green .................................. 408
2. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins ............................................. 410
3. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 ............................................. 415
4. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa ............................................... 418
5. The U.S. Supreme Court's Treatment of ADEA Claims ... 420
D. Direct or Circumstantial Evidence: Setting the Stage for
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc ..................................... 421
II. GROSS V. FBL FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC .............................................. 423
A. The Road to the Supreme Court ............................................... 424
1. Factual Background ........................................................... 424
2. Procedural Posture ............................................................. 424
B. Arguments on Appeal ............................................................... 425
C. The Supreme Court Case .......................................................... 428
1. The M ajority Opinion ........................................................ 428
2. The D issenting Opinions .................................................... 431
D . Post-G ross Cases ...................................................................... 436
E. Reactions to the Court's Decision ............................................ 438
III. CONGRESS SHOULD AMEND THE ADEA TO INCLUDE § 107 ............. 442
A . Questions After Gross ............................................................... 443
1. How Far Does Gross Reach? ......................... . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . . 443
2. Does Gross Affect McDonnell Douglas? .......................... 444
B. The Next Step: Congress Should Amend the ADEA ................ 446
1. Interest in Eliminating Age Discrimination in
E m ploym ent ...................................................................... 447
2. "Because of' Should Mean "Motivating Factor" for
L iability ............................................................................. 448
3. "Because of' Should Mean "But-For" for Damages ......... 450
C O N CLU SIO N ............................................................................................. 45 1
[Vol. 78
MIXED-MOTIVES CLAIMS AND GROSS
INTRODUCTION
"Age to me means nothing. I can't get old; I'm working. I was old when
I was twenty-one and out of work. As long as you're working, you stay
young."' The importance of staying active throughout one's life cannot be
overstated. 2 However, age discrimination can prevent older workers from
continuing to work in the later years of their lives. 3 If employers falsely
associate age with a lack of productivity, then the employee can be deprived
of a chance to be a contributing member of society. 4
Age discrimination clearly has a negative impact on the victims. 5 Elder
workers, on average, will be unemployed for seventy-five percent longer
than younger workers. 6 Victimized older employees who are actually
capable workers can be frustrated and experience anxieties because of age
discrimination. 7  As workers age and are terminated from their
employment, it can become more difficult for them to gain new
employment. 8  This is particularly alarming because of the current
1. RON GRAVES & RON PALERMO, ADVERSITY TO SUCCESS! 25 OPTIMISTIC PEOPLE WHO
OVERCAME 80 (2007) (quoting George Burns (1896-1996)).
2. See W. WILLARD WIRTZ, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR TO THE CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 715
OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 1 (1965).
There is ... no harsher verdict in most men's lives than someone else's judgment
that they are no longer worth their keep. It is then, when the answer at the hiring
gate is "You're too old," that a man turns away, . . . finding "nothing to look
backward to with pride, nothing to look forward to with hope."
Id.; see also BARBARA T. LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT LAW 5 (2003) ("The cumulative effect of an arbitrary and illegal termination
of a useful and productive older employee is a cruel blow to the dignity and self-respect of
one who has devoted his life to productive work, and can take a dramatic toll." (citing
Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 404 F. Supp. 324, 329 (D.N.J. 1975))).
3. See WIRTZ, supra note 2, at 18.
4. See Katherine Krupa Green, Comment, A Reason To Discriminate: Curtailing the
Use of Title VII Analysis in Claims Arising Under the ADEA, 65 LA. L. REV. 411, 414-15
(2004) ("The Department of Labor report noted that employers held beliefs and
misconceptions about older workers being slower and less productive .... In a capitalist
society such as ours, being perceived as unproductive is the death knell in employment."
(citing WIRTZ, supra note 2, at 8)).
5. See WIRTZ, supra note 2, at 18-19; DAVID NEUMARK, REASSESSING THE AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT 2 (2008).
6. WIRTZ, supra note 2, at 18. But see NEUMARK, supra note 5, at 12 ("Bureau of
Labor Statistics data indicate that older workers are still considerably more likely than
younger workers to have long unemployment durations (U.S. Department of Labor, 2007)
Of course, longer durations do not necessarily reflect simply discrimination against older
workers." (citing U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and
Earnings (2007), www.bls.gov./cps/home.htm#annual (last visited Aug. 8, 2007))).
7. WIRTZ, supra note 2, at 18-19.
8. Green, supra note 4, at 434 ("The Congressional record contained ample documents
which reflected the common societal consensus, that over time, as one ages, getting hired
becomes more difficult, and when there is a choice to be made between a younger and an
older individual for a job position, the younger individual will have the upper hand because
she will not be 'tagged with demeaning stereotype[s]."' (alteration in original) (quoting Gen.
Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004))) (discussing the U.S. Supreme
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economic crisis in the United States. 9 Because of the stock market decline
and the decrease in the values of 401(k) plans, American workers need to
work later in life. 10 This can be a problem for individuals if companies lay
off older, higher-paid workers in order to survive the economic downturn. "
Age discrimination also has widespread effects on parties beyond those
who are the victims. 12 If older workers are unemployed, they depend on
public spending for income and health insurance, placing a burden on
others. 13 However, reducing age discrimination could mean greater levels
of senior employment, leading to lower "dependency ratios," greater
income, and more taxes, ultimately benefitting the public. 14
In 1967, to address these concerns, Congress enacted the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) to combat discrimination
based on an employee's age. 15 The ADEA makes it unlawful for an
employer to make a decision "because of" an employee's age.16 The
language of the ADEA was modeled after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 196417 (Title VII), which makes it unlawful for an employer to make a
Court's opinion in General Dynamics and its conclusion that Congress intended the ADEA
to only protect older workers from discrimination, rather than both older and younger
workers).
9. Steven Greenhouse, Working Longer as Jobs Contract, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2008, at
F 1. In addition, the number of age discrimination claims filed with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) increased 25.8% in 2008, from 19,103 in 2007 to 24,582
in 2008. Charge Statistics From the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission FY
1997 Through FY 2008, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2009).
10. See Greenhouse, supra note 9.
11. Id. Companies are permitted to terminate older, high-paid employees, but the reason
for termination cannot be based on a stereotype about age. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507
U.S. 604, 610 (1993) (holding that an employer firing an employee because the employee's
pension benefits were about to vest does not violate the ADEA because the decision to
terminate was not made "because of' the employee's age); see infra Part I.C.5 (discussing
Hazen Paper Co.). This is consistent with the purpose of the ADEA, which aims to prevent
arbitrary discrimination based on age. Id. ("It is the very essence of age discrimination for an
older employee to be fired because the employer believes that productivity and competence
decline with old age."). An employer that terminates an older employee to save money is
free to do so as long as the decision is not based on the employee's age. Id.; see also Green,
supra note 4, at 423-24 (explaining the Court's decision in Hazen Paper Co.).
12. See NEUMARK, supra note 5, at 2.
13. Id.
14. Id. The dependency ratio is "the ratio of nonworking (i.e., 'dependent') persons to
the economically active." Id. at 2 n.3.
15. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 2(b), 81 Stat.
602, 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2006)).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2006). The full text of the relevant provision reads, "It shall
be unlawful for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age ..." Id.
17. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006)). The U.S. Supreme Court has noted, "the prohibitions
of the ADEA were derived in haec verba from Title VII." Nancy Lane, After Price
Waterhouse and the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Providing Attorney's Fees to Plaintiffs in
Mixed Motive Age Discrimination Cases, 3 ELDER L.J. 341, 346-47 (1995) (citing Oscar
Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 755 (1979)).
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decision "because of' an "individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin."' 18 Because of the similarity in language, courts often applied Title
VII analyses to claims brought under the ADEA, specifically for claims of
disparate treatment based on age. 19 In 1991, Congress amended Title VII
through § 107 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (1991 Act) by adding 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), which states that an unlawful employment practice is
established when a claimant "demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even
though other factors also motivated the practice." 20  Section 107 also
limited the remedies a plaintiff may recover if a defendant proved that he
would have "taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible
motivating factor."21
The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Gross v. FBL Financial
Services, Inc.22 responded to a circuit split that had arisen whereby courts
divided over whether direct evidence of discrimination was required for
plaintiffs to receive a "mixed-motives" analysis under the ADEA. 23 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the question in Gross.24 This
Note focuses on the Supreme Court's decision in Gross and its implications
for ADEA disparate treatment law.
Part I provides an overview of the ADEA, Title VII, the 1991 Act, and
Supreme Court cases that shaped how federal courts analyzed disparate
treatment claims brought under the ADEA and Title VII. In addition, Part I
briefly describes the split in authority leading up to Gross. Part II discusses
Gross, as well as reactions to the Court's decision. Part III provides an
overview of questions left open by the Court's holding in Gross and urges
Congress to amend the ADEA to include the language of § 107 so that
mixed-motives claims are a viable option for ADEA plaintiffs.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2)(a)(1) (2006). The full text of the relevant provision reads,
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-() to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin ....
Id.
19. "Disparate treatment" has been defined as "the most easily understood type of
discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because
of their race, color, religion, sex,... national origin," or age. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15 (1977). See infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
20. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006)).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).
22. 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009).
23. Id.; see Jamie Darin Prenkert, The Role of Second-Order Uniformity in Disparate
Treatment Law: McDonnell Douglas's Longevity and the Mixed-Motives Mess, 45 AM. Bus.
L.J. 511, 541-52 (2008) (discussing fragmentation of ADEA disparate treatment law).
24. See infra Part II.
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I. THE ADEA AND TITLE VII
Part I discusses the background of the ADEA and Title VII. Part L.A
explains the reasons Congress enacted the ADEA and the ADEA's
substantive structure and provisions. Part I.B discusses Title VII and the
similarities and differences between Title VII and the ADEA. Part I.C
discusses the seminal Supreme Court cases that have shaped disparate
treatment discrimination claims, including a brief look at language used by
the Court in analyzing ADEA cases. In addition, Part I.C describes § 107
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which amended Title VII. Part I.D
provides a brief overview of the conflict that divided circuit courts,
prompting the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in Gross v. FBL Financial
Services, Inc.
A. Purpose and Reasoning Behind Enacting the ADEA
When Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it instructed the
Secretary of Labor, Willard Wirtz, to conduct a study on the effect age
discrimination in employment may have on those discriminated against, as
well as any effect it may have on the economy. 25 Wirtz's study found that
age discrimination differed from discrimination based on race. 26 According
to the study, there was little evidence of discrimination based on dislike of
older workers; rather, employers often discriminated against older workers
"because of assumptions about the effect of age on their ability to do a job
when there is in fact no basis for these assumptions.' 27 This type of
discrimination is arbitrary and is one of the reasons that Congress passed
the ADEA in 1967.28
The ADEA states, in relevant part, "It shall be unlawful for an
employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's age . . "29 Congress recognized that age can affect an
employee's ability to do some jobs and therefore included a provision
25. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 715, 78 Stat. 241, 265; see also
WIRTZ, supra note 2, at 1.
26. See WIRTZ, supra note 2, at 2; see also Lane, supra note 17, at 344 n.14 (explaining
that race discrimination is often caused by hatred, fear, or ill-will, while age discrimination
stems from misconceptions about age (citing Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act's Forgotten Affirmative Defense: The Reasonable Factors Other Than Age
Exception, 66 B.U. L. REV. 155, 220 (1986))).
27. WIRTZ, supra note 2, at 2, 6.
28. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 2(b), 81 Stat.
602, 602 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2006)); see Green, supra note 4, at 415-16
(explaining that Congress enacted the ADEA in response to the U.S. Department of Labor
study's finding that discrimination typically stemmed from misconceptions about the ability
and productivity of older employees).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1); see also Lane, supra note 17, at 345 ("The ADEA prohibits
discrimination across a broad range of employment activities, including hiring, discharges,
decisions regarding compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges of employment, job
classifications, job referrals, and exclusion from union membership.").
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in the ADEA that states, "It shall not be unlawful for an employer,
employment agency, or labor organization-(1) to take any action
otherwise prohibited.., where age is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business, or
where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than
age .... -130 The Act initially protected employees who were between the
ages of forty and sixty-five, 3 1 but the upper age limit was extended to
seventy in 1978,32 and finally removed completely in 1986. 33 The ADEA
applies to employers who have twenty or more employees working for
them. 34
The purposes of enacting the ADEA were to "promote the employment
of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary
age discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers and workers
find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on
employment."' 35  Specifically, the ADEA is aimed at deterring age
discrimination and compensating victims of age discrimination. 36  It
achieves these goals through its structure, as discussed below.
The "substantive structure" of the ADEA was modeled after Title VII, 37
and the remedial and procedural provisions were modeled after the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 38  Following the FLSA, Congress
incorporated two primary mechanisms to enforce the ADEA: the Secretary
of Labor may file a suit on behalf of the alleged victim of age
discrimination for injunctive and monetary relief, or a private civil action
can be brought by the individual. 39 An ADEA claimant may recover
30. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1).
31. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 12, 81 Stat.
602, 607.
32. Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 12, 92
Stat 189, 189; see also H. Lane Dennard, Jr. & Kendall L. Kelly, Price Waterhouse: Alive
and Well Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 51 MERCER L. REV. 721, 725
n.17 (2000).
33. Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, §
2(c), 100 Stat. 3342, 3342; see also Dennard & Kelly, supra note 32.
34. See HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW AND PRACTICE 372 (2001).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b).
36. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995) (discussing
the deterrent and compensatory goals of the ADEA); see also Lane, supra note 17, at 344-45
("[The ADEA] has both a remedial goal to compensate age discrimination victims and a
broad social policy goal to eliminate arbitrary age discrimination in society.").
37. See infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
38. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2006); see also 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) ("The provisions of
this chapter shall be enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures
provided in sections 211 (b), 216 (except for subsection (a) thereof), and 217 of this title, and
subsection (c) of this section."); Lane, supra note 17, at 345, 347-48 (explaining that the
ADEA was modeled after Title VII and the FLSA).
39. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 579-81 (1978) (explaining that these two
mechanisms were incorporated into the ADEA from the FLSA and that Congress had
intended ADEA claimants to have a right to a jury trial in private actions because this was
well established under the FLSA).
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unpaid wages, liquidated damages, and attorney's fees; these remedies were
available under the FLSA. 40 In addition to these remedies, the ADEA
states that a court can authorize "legal or equitable relief' to accomplish the
ADEA's purpose. 41
The substantive provisions of the ADEA were modeled after Title VII.
42
Even though the statutes were very similar, there are differences to note.
43
One of the main differences is that the ADEA is aimed at "the arbitrary use
of age as a proxy for ability," while "Title VII makes unlawful all
discrimination based on [race, gender, and national origin]."' 44 The ADEA
also permits employers to differentiate between employees "based on
reasonable factors other than age," demonstrating that Congress wanted to
ensure that employers would evaluate older workers based on their abilities,
rather than their age.45 Despite these differences, the ADEA was largely
modeled after Title VII, including its "substantive provisions and proof
considerations." 46
B. Title VII and the ADEA
Title VII was the first piece of legislation that prohibited employers from
making decisions regarding their employees based on an employee's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 47 Title VII was primarily aimed at
combating race discrimination against African Americans, 48 but it also
prohibited consideration of color, religion, sex, and national origin.49 Age
40. See Lane, supra note 17, at 347-48 ("Section 7(b) of the ADEA explicitly
incorporates section 11 (b) and part of section 16 of the FLSA. Section 7(b) authorizes a
private suit for unpaid wages and an equal amount in liquidated damages and authorizes the
Secretary of Labor to sue for injunctive relief, as well as the unpaid wages and liquidated
damages." (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 211 (b), 216(b)-(e), 626(b) (1988 & Supp. 1991))).
41. Id. at 348.
42. See Dennard & Kelly, supra note 32, at 727 ("[S]ubstantive provisions [of the
ADEA] are rooted in Title VII.").
43. See Lane, supra note 17, at 346.
44. See id. (distinguishing between Title VII and the ADEA by explaining that the
ADEA does not "condenm[] all discrimination based on age," while Title VII makes any
consideration of the protected characteristics unlawful).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1); see also Lane, supra note 17, at 346 (explaining that
expressly including "reasonable factors other than age" in the ADEA "'highlight[s]
[Congress's] concern that older workers be evaluated objectively on the basis of their
performance"' (alterations in original) (quoting Duffy v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp.,
738 F.2d 1393, 1399 (3d Cir. 1984))). The role that the "reasonable factors other than age"
defense plays in ADEA cases is unclear. Prenkert, supra note 23, at 548-50. The Supreme
Court recently held that the "reasonable factors other than age" provision is an affirmative
defense for disparate impact cases. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395,
2400 (2008); Prenkert, supra note 23, at 548 n.193; see infra note 59 and accompanying text
(defining disparate impact claims). Professor Jamie Prenkert notes that most courts have
avoided the "reasonable factors other than age" provision and simply followed the Price
Waterhouse same-decision defense in disparate treatment cases brought under the ADEA.
Prenkert, supra note 23, at 549-50.
46. Lane, supra note 17, at 346.
47. See Green, supra note 4, at 414.
48. Id.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2006).
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was not included as a protected characteristic in Title VII, in part because
the nature of the discrimination is different than discrimination based on the
characteristics included in the Act.50
Title VII prohibits an employer from making an employment decision
"because of' an individual's "race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin."' 51 As noted above, the ADEA similarly prohibits an employer from
making a decision "because of' an individual's age. 52 Since the language
of the acts was nearly identical, courts typically held that an interpretation
of one act applied to the other act. 53 However, the Supreme Court's
decision in Gross has disrupted any uniformity in analysis. 54 In the past,
courts frequently applied Title VII analysis for disparate treatment and
disparate impact claims to similar claims brought under the ADEA. 55
In a claim for disparate treatment under the ADEA, a plaintiff alleges that
the employer treated the plaintiff less favorably than other employees
because of the plaintiffs age.56 A disparate treatment plaintiff must prove
that the employer had a discriminatory motive for an adverse employment
action. 57 The way a plaintiff may prove an employer's discriminatory
motive in disparate treatment claims of age discrimination will be discussed
in greater detail in Part I.C of this Note. 58
Disparate impact claims of age discrimination "involve employment
practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but
that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be
justified by business necessity. ' 59  A plaintiff does not have to show
intentional discrimination in order to prove disparate impact; the fact that
the practice has a disparate impact on the protected class is sufficient. 60
50. See Green, supra note 4, at 414; see also supra notes 26, 44 and accompanying text.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); see supra note 18 and accompanying text.
52. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2006); see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
53. See Green, supra note 4, at 418 & n.67 ("Due to their similar statutory construction
and purpose, courts have traditionally relied upon Title VII to serve as the guide or standard
by which claims arising under the ADEA are analyzed."); see also Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs.,
Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2354-55 & n.5 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Courts of Appeals to
have considered the issue unanimously have applied Price Waterhouse to ADEA claims.");
Lane supra note 17, at 347 n.33 (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. I11,
121 (1985); Fields v. Clark Univ., 817 F.2d 931, 934 n.I (1st Cir. 1987); Hinton v. Bd. of
Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1475, 1481 (N.D. Il. 1990)).
54. See infra Part II.
55. See Green, supra note 4, at 418 n.67 (citing Hase v. Missouri, 972 F.2d 893 (8th Cir.
1992); Coburn v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 711 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Ragland v.
Rock-Tenn Co., 955 F. Supp. 1009 (N.D. Ill. 1997)) (explaining that each of these cases
discussed the applicability of McDonnell Douglas to ADEA cases).
56. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15 (1977).
57. See Green supra note 4, at 419 & n.68.
58. See infra Part I.C for an explanation of the different frameworks available for
proving intentional discrimination.
59. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15. The Supreme Court held that
disparate impact claims are available under the ADEA in Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S.
228, 232 (2005).
60. See Green, supra note 4, at 421. This Note focuses on disparate treatment claims.
For a thorough analysis of disparate impact claims, see Jamie Darin Prenkert, Bizarro
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C. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and Seminal Supreme Court Cases That
Shaped the Analysis of ADEA and Title VII Disparate Treatment Claims
1. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,61 decided in 1973, was a seminal
case that shaped the burden-of-proof analysis for claims brought under Title
VII and, subsequently, claims brought under the ADEA. 62 In McDonnell
Douglas, the plaintiff brought a claim for race discrimination under Title
VII against his former employer. 63 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine the "order and allocation of proof in a private, non-class action
challenging employment discrimination. '64
The Supreme Court held that in a Title VII claim, the plaintiff carried the
burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. 65 This prima
facie case of discrimination "create[d] a legally mandatory, rebuttable
presumption of unlawful motive."' 66 A plaintiff establishes a prima facie
case of discrimination if he shows
(i) that he belongs to a [protected class]; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii)
that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his
rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications. 67
The burden of establishing this prima facie case is "not onerous."' 68 Once
the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, a presumption that the
defendant's action was discriminatory is created. 69
Statutory Stare Decisis, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 217 (2007) (analyzing how disparate
impact cases are treated under the ADEA).
61. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
62. See Lovell v. Covenant Homeland Sec. Solutions, Ltd., No. G-07-0412, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 103686, at *23 (D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2008) (citing Russell v. McKinney Hosp.
Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 222 (5th Cir. 2000)) (applying McDonnell Douglas to an ADEA
case, stating "proof via circumstantial evidence is assembled using the framework set forth
in the seminal case of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green"); see also Green, supra note 4, at
418 n.67.
63. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 796.
64. Id. at 800.
65. Id. at 802. The Supreme Court subsequently stated that "the shifting burdens of
proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas are designed to assure that the 'plaintiff [has] his day
in court despite the unavailability of direct evidence."' Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (alteration in original) (quoting Loeb v. Textron, Inc.,
600 F.2d 1003, 1014 (1st Cir. 1979)).
66. See Green, supra note 4, at 420 (citing REBECCA HANNER WHITE, EMPLOYMENT LAW
AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 79 (1998)).
67. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
68. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (elaborating on
the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas).
69. Id. at 254. The Supreme Court has explained the purpose of the prima facie case in
McDonnell Douglas, stating it "eliminate[d] the most common nondiscriminatory reasons
for the plaintiff's rejection." Id.; see also Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576
(1978) ("[P]laintiff carries the initial burden of showing actions taken by the employer from
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According to the Supreme Court, once the plaintiff established a prima
facie case of discrimination, the burden shifted to the defendant to articulate
a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for its employment decision. 70
The defendant's burden is a burden of production, 71 and the plaintiff retains
the burden of persuasion throughout. 72  If the defendant articulates a
nondiscriminatory reason, the presumption of discrimination created by
plaintiff's prima facie case is rebutted.73 However, "[i]f the trier of fact
believes the plaintiffs evidence, and if the employer is silent in the face of
the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no
issue of fact remains in the case."'74
The Court in McDonnell Douglas held that if the defendant articulates a
nondiscriminatory reason, the plaintiff must have an opportunity to present
evidence that the given reason was a pretext for discrimination. 75 In Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,76 the Court explained that in
this third step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff has the
chance to show that the defendant's proffered reason was not the "true
which one can infer, if such actions remain unexplained, that it is more likely than not that
such actions were 'based on a discriminatory criterion illegal under the [1964] Act."'
(quoting Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977))). According to
scholars, the "prima facie case framework was developed to 'compensate' for the fact that
direct evidence may be difficult to supply in intentional discrimination cases." Dennard &
Kelly, supra note 32, at 735 (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271
(1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Landgraf v. Usi Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244,
251 (1994)). The Court acknowledged that the proof required for the prima facie case set
out in McDonnell Douglas "necessarily will vary" depending on the facts of each case
brought under Title VII. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13; see also O'Connor v.
Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 310-13 (1996) (stating that in an ADEA case
where a fifty-six-year-old plaintiff was discharged from his job and replaced by a forty-year-
old employee, the third prong of the prima facie case is that the plaintiff was meeting his
employer's legitimate expectations and the fourth prong is that plaintiff was replaced by
someone substantially younger than him).
70. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
71. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55 (stating that defendant does not need to persuade the
court that the proffered reason actually motivated the defendant, holding that "[i]t is
sufficient if the defendant's evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it
discriminated against the plaintiff').
72. Id. at 256.
73. Id. at 255; see also Matthew R. Scott & Russell D. Chapman, Much Ado About
Nothing-Why Desert Palace Neither Murdered McDonnell Douglas nor Transformed All
Employment Discrimination Cases to Mixed-Motive, 36 ST. MARY'S L.J. 395, 398 (2005)
("[T]he Court instructed us that, once the defendant successfully meets its burden of
production, 'the McDonnell Douglas framework-with its presumptions and burdens-is no
longer relevant.'. . . Thus, the trier of fact must proceed 'to decide the ultimate question:
whether plaintiff has proven, that the defendant intentionally discriminated against him
because of' the impermissible factor." (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S.
502, 510-11 (1993))).
74. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
75. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. As the Court explained in Burdine, the
defendant's articulated nondiscriminatory reason will "present[] a legitimate reason for the
action and . . . frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a
full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56.
76. 450 U.S. 248.
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reason" for the adverse employment action. 77 This is where the plaintiff
carries the "ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the
victim of intentional discrimination. She may succeed ... either directly by
persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the
employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered
explanation is unworthy of credence."' 78  This burden-shifting pretext
analysis set out in McDonnell Douglas and clarified in Burdine has
consistently been applied to claims brought under the ADEA. 79
2. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,80 the Supreme Court granted certiorari
to determine the burdens of proof that a defendant and a plaintiff each carry
in a Title VII "mixed-motives" claim for disparate treatment. 81 In a mixed-
motives case, a defendant is motivated by both legitimate and illegitimate
reasons when it makes an adverse employment decision regarding the
plaintiff.82 In Price Waterhouse, the plaintiff brought a lawsuit against the
77. Id. at 255-56.
78. Id. at 256; see also Prenkert, supra note 23, at 524-25. According to one scholar,
Professor Michael Zimmer, "in McDonnell Douglas cases, the courts have typically required
the plaintiff to prove that discriminatory motivation was the but-for or the determinative
influence in the employer's decision." Michael J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law:
Price Waterhouse Is Dead, Whither McDonnell Douglas? 53 EMORY L.J. 1887, 1930 (2004).
Professor Zimmer also explains that the McDonnell Douglas framework provided a process
of elimination for plaintiffs to prove intentional discrimination. Id. at 1894. Professor
Zimmer states that under McDonnell Douglas, "[a] plaintiff could prove discrimination using
circumstantial evidence without having to show that the employer had admitted that it was
discriminating." Id.; see also Kristina N. Klein, Note, Oasis or Mirage? Desert Palace and
Its Impact on the Summary Judgment Landscape, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1177, 1182 (2006)
("The McDonnell Douglas scheme was born out of the notion that Title VII cases required
proof of but-for, or sole-factor, causation. This meant that plaintiffs essentially had to prove
that but for the plaintiff's protected status, the employer would not have taken the adverse
employment action." (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240-41 (1989)
(plurality opinion), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166,
105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Landgraf v. Usi Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 251 (1994);
William R. Corbett, An Allegory of the Cave and the Desert Palace, 41 Hous. L. REv. 1549,
1567-68 (2005))).
79. See supra note 53; see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S.
133, 142 (2000) ("This Court has not squarely addressed whether the McDonnell Douglas
framework, developed to assess claims brought under § 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, also applies to ADEA actions .... [W]e shall assume, arguendo, that the
McDonnell Douglas framework is fully applicable here." (citing O'Connor v. Consol. Coin
Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311 (1996))); O'Connor, 517 U.S. at 311 ("We have never had
occasion to decide whether that application of the Title VII rule to the ADEA context is
correct, but since the parties do not contest that point, we shall assume it."). In Gross v. FBL
Financial Services, Inc., the Supreme Court stated it had never "definitively decided"
whether McDonnell Douglas applied to ADEA cases. 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349-50 n.2 (2009).
See infra Parts II.D and III.A.2 for further discussion regarding Gross's impact on
McDonnell Douglas in ADEA cases.
80. 490 U.S. 228.
81. Id. at 232.
82. Id.; see also Scott & Chapman, supra note 73, at 405 (explaining that a plaintiff's
case is not transformed into a mixed-motives case just because plaintiff alleges a
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accounting firm Price Waterhouse for gender discrimination under Title
VII. 83 The plaintiff presented evidence of sexist comments made by her
co-workers involved in deciding whether she would become a partner. 84
To challenge the plaintiffs allegations, Price Waterhouse presented
evidence that the plaintiff was "sometimes overly aggressive, unduly harsh,
difficult to work with and impatient with staff."'85 The U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia determined that even though these were
legitimate reasons for not making the plaintiff partner, illegitimate,
discriminatory reasons also motivated defendant's decision. 86
The Supreme Court established that in a mixed-motives case, if the
plaintiff showed the defendant had a discriminatory motive, the defendant
would be liable unless it "prov[ed] that it would have made the same
decision even if it had not allowed gender to play such a role."'8 7
Justice William Brennan wrote the plurality opinion for the Court, basing
the opinion on the language of Title VII. 88 According to the plurality, Title
VII's "because of' language "mean[s] that gender must be irrelevant to
employment decisions." 89  If a Title VII claimant proved that an
discriminatory motive and defendant asserts a nondiscriminatory motive). Matthew Scott &
Russell Chapman state, "[A] true mixed motive case under § 2000e-2(m) involves either a
defendant who (a) admits to a partially discriminatory reason for its actions, while also
claiming it would have taken the same action were it not for the illegitimate rationale or (b)
otherwise credible evidence to support such a finding." Id. The article distinguishes a
mixed-motives case from a pretext case because in a pretext case brought under § 2000e-
2(a), the plaintiff alleges a discriminatory motive, and the defendant denies that motive and
offers only a nondiscriminatory motive. Id.
83. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 231-32 (plurality opinion).
84. Id. at 234-35.
85. Id. at 235 (quoting Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp 1109, 1113 (D.C. Cir.
1985)).
86. See id. at 236-37.
87. Id. at 244-45. The Supreme Court held that the defendant should prove this by a
preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 253. According to the plurality, "the employer's
burden is most appropriately deemed an affirmative defense: the plaintiff must persuade the
factfinder on one point, and then the employer, if it wishes to prevail, must persuade it on
another." Id. at 246.
88. Id. at 239-40.
89. Id. at 240 ("To construe the words 'because of' as colloquial shorthand for 'but-for
causation,' . . . is to misunderstand them."). One scholar explains the plurality's
interpretation of the standard of causation:
"But-for" generally means that reliance on race or another protected characteristic
of the plaintiff was necessary for the employer to have acted as it did, even though
factors other than race may have influenced the employer's decision. The standard
is met if, but for the plaintiffs race, the employer would not have taken the action
it did.
Michael J. Zimmer, A Chain of Inferences Proving Discrimination, 79 U. COLO. L. REv.
1243, 1250 (2008). Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Justice Anthony Kennedy, and Justice
Antonin Scalia dissented in Price Waterhouse. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 279 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting). The dissenters would follow the framework established in McDonnell
Douglas and Burdine, and require a Title VII claimant to bear the burden of proving "but-
for" causation in order to establish a claim. Id. at 281,286-87 & n.3. The dissent also stated,
"[t]he plurality's causation analysis is misdirected, for it is clear that, whoever bears the
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illegitimate criterion was a motivating factor in the employer's decision,
this violates Title VII unless the defendant proved the affirmative
defense. 90 Therefore, a defendant will escape liability if he proves that he
would have made the same decision regardless of the plaintiffs protected
characteristic. 91
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor concurred in the judgment, but did not
agree with the plurality's interpretation of Title VII's language or its stance
on when the burden should shift to the employer. 92 Justice O'Connor
disagreed with the plurality because
the plurality appears to conclude that if a decisional process is "tainted"
by awareness of sex or race in any way, the employer has violated the
statute, and Title VII thus commands that the burden shift to the employer
.... The plurality thus effectively reads the causation requirement out of
the statute, and then replaces it with an "affirmative defense." 93
Justice O'Connor recognized the potential difficulty that proving but-for
causation could create for plaintiffs in discrimination cases. 94  Justice
burden of proof on the issue, Title VII liability requires a finding of but-for causation." Id. at
281.
90. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241 (plurality opinion) ("Title VII meant to condemn
even those decisions based on a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate considerations. When,
therefore, an employer considers both gender and legitimate factors at the time of making a
decision, that decision was 'because of sex and the other, legitimate considerations ... .
91. Id. at 244-45; see supra note 87 and accompanying text.
92. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 261-62 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("My
disagreement stems from the plurality's conclusions concerning the substantive requirement
of causation under the statute and its broad statements regarding the applicability of the
allocation of the burden of
proof .... I write separately to . . . express my views as to when and how the strong
medicine of requiring the employer to bear the burden of persuasion on the issue of
causation should be administered.").
93. Id. at 276.
94. Justice O'Connor cited areas of tort liability in which "leaving the burden of
persuasion on the plaintiff to prove 'but-for' causation would be both unfair and destructive
of the deterrent purposes embodied in the concept of duty of care." Id. at 263. She noted that
the burden shifts to defendants in multiple causation cases, and also noted the difficulties
that requiring a Title VII claimant to prove but-for causation might create. Id. at 264 ("While
requiring that the plaintiff in a tort suit or a Title VII action prove that the defendant's
'breach of duty' was the 'but-for' cause of an injury does not generally hamper effective
enforcement of the policies behind those causes of action, 'at other times the [but-for] test
demands the impossible. It challenges the imagination of the trier to probe into a purely
fanciful and unknowable state of affairs. He is invited to make an estimate concerning facts
that concededly never existed. The very uncertainty as to what might have happened opens
the door wide for conjecture. But when conjecture is demanded it can be given a direction
that is consistent with the policy considerations that underlie the controversy."' (alteration in
original) (quoting Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REv. 60, 67
(1956))). Commentators have noted the difficulty of proving discriminatory intent in
disparate treatment cases as well. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Davis, Price-Fixing: Refining the
Price Waterhouse Standard and Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.
859, 864 (2004) ("Subtle discrimination cases such as McDonnell Douglas had dogged the
judiciary because of the elusiveness of proving or disproving discriminatory intent. Unlike
most other types of cases, discrimination suits often rest on a thin evidentiary base. ...
[M]any discrimination cases depend on revealing shadowy motives that no one would
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O'Connor stated, "[I]n order to justify shifting the burden on the issue of
causation to the defendant, a disparate treatment plaintiff must show by
direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the
decision." 95 Therefore, Justice O'Connor's opinion differed in two ways
from the plurality's: (1) she required direct evidence of discrimination, and
(2) the discrimination must have been a substantial factor in the employer's
decision. 96 The plurality did not mention a direct evidence requirement,
publicly articulate or be foolish enough to memorialize."); Klein, supra note 78, at 1181
("[P]roving intentional discrimination is quite difficult." (citing Davis, supra)).
95. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor
did not define direct evidence, but she provided examples of what did not constitute direct
evidence. See id. at 277. She stated that "stray remarks in the workplace," "statements by
nondecisionmakers, or statements made by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional
process itself," are not direct evidence and therefore do not justify shifting the burden of
persuasion to the defendant. Id. Scholars and courts have discussed this direct evidence
requirement at great length, ranging from what constitutes direct evidence to whether or not
it is required to receive a mixed-motives analysis. Donald Spero, in his column, Labor Law:
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa-Does McDonnell Douglas Survive?, discusses different ways
courts have defined direct evidence of discrimination. FLA. B.J., Nov. 2004, at 53, 54 (2004).
Spero notes the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has rejected the Black's Law
Dictionary definition of direct evidence. Id. According to the court in Rollins v. TechSouth,
Inc., Black's Law Dictionary defines direct evidence as "'evidence which if believed, proves
existence of fact in issue without inference or presumption."' Rollins, 833 F.2d 1525, 1528
n.6 (1 1th Cir. 1987) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 413 (5th ed. 1979)). In his column,
Spero notes that the Eleventh Circuit has defined direct evidence as "'evidence from which a
reasonable trier of fact could find, more probably than not, a causal link between an adverse
employment action and a protected personal characteristic."' Spero, supra, at 54 (quoting
Wright v. Southland, 187 F.3d 1287, 1293 (1 1th Cir. 1999)). The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit considered a statement that was "'made by a decision maker, pertained to
the decisional process, bore squarely on the employment decisions at issue ... and straight-
forwardly conveyed age animus' to be direct evidence. Id. (quoting Febres v. Challenger
Caribbean Corp., 214 F.3d 57, 61 (1st Cir. 2000)).
96. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276-77 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("It should be
obvious that the threshold standard I would adopt for shifting the burden of persuasion to the
defendant differs substantially from that proposed by the plurality .... "). According to
Professor Martin Katz, "[t]he source of plaintiffs' burden to prove 'but for' causation is the
'direct evidence' requirement in Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Price Waterhouse."
Martin J. Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment (Really), 59 HASTINGS L.J. 643, 660 (2008)
[hereinafter Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment] (explaining that under Price Waterhouse, a
plaintiff can prove "motivating factor" causation and shift the burden of persuasion to the
defendant "to prove a lack of 'but for' causation," but noting that Justice O'Connor's "direct
evidence" requirement limits when a plaintiff can utilize the burden-shifting mechanism).
Professor Katz also points out that "substantial factor" causation does not necessarily differ
from "motivating factor" causation. Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title
VII: Making Sense of Causation in Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489, 507 (2006)
[hereinafter Katz, Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII]. Katz states, "it is not clear that
Justice O'Connor really rejected the plurality's 'motivating factor' test-much less that she
intended the 'substantial factor' test to be more restrictive. Nowhere in her concurrence does
she criticize the 'motivating factor' test." Id. at 508. In addition, Professor Katz points out
that the Supreme Court had previously "expressly equated the two standards, holding that the
plaintiff must show that his protected speech 'was a substantial factor [in the employer's
termination decision] or to put it in other words, that it was a motivating factor."' Id. at 507
(alteration in original) (quoting Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. Of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274, 287 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 18, 22, Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct.
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and it stated a plaintiff must prove that discrimination was a "motivating
factor" in the employer's decision. 97
Subsequent courts followed Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion by
requiring a plaintiff to present direct evidence in order to receive a mixed-
motives analysis. 98 Therefore, if a plaintiff presents direct evidence of
discrimination and proves that the defendant relied on an illegitimate factor
when making a decision regarding the plaintiff's employment, the burden of
persuasion shifts to the defendant to prove by a preponderance of evidence
that he would have made the same decision regardless of the illegitimate
reason.99 If the defendant proves this, he is not liable under Title VII. 100
The Supreme Court plurality's ruling in Price Waterhouse limited an
employee's protection against intentional discrimination in the
2343 (2009) (No. 08-441) (quoting the same language in Mt. Healthy and pointing out that
the Price Waterhouse plurality opinion and Justice Byron White's concurring opinion both
relied on Mt. Healthy in the analyses). See infra note 97 for Justice White's concurring
opinion. Therefore, for Professor Katz, "we should understand the 'substantial factor' test,
like the 'motivating factor' test, as referring to the concept of minimal causation." Katz,
Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII, supra, at 507.
97. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258 (plurality opinion); see also Michael J.
Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform Structure of Disparate Treatment Discrimination
Litigation, 30 GA. L. REv. 563, 580-82 (1996). Justice White also wrote a separate
concurring opinion. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258 (White, J., concurring). Justice
White would hold that the plaintiffs "burden was to show that the unlawful motive was a
substantial factor in the adverse employment action," and if plaintiff established this, the
burden of persuasion should shift to the defendant to prove that he would have made the
same decision. Id. at 259-60. Justice White departed from the plurality opinion because he
disagreed with the type of evidence that an employer may present when proving the same-
decision defense. Id. at 260-61. Justice White interpreted the plurality opinion to require
objective evidence, but he believed that if "the employer credibly testifies that the action
would have been taken for legitimate reasons alone, this should be ample proof." Id. at 261.
98. See Klein, supra note 78, at 1184 n.58 (2006) (citing courts that have followed
Justice O'Connor's opinion); see also Prenkert, supra note 23, at 532 (explaining that courts
have treated Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion as controlling because "her approach
was the most restrictive"); Spero, supra note 95, at 54 ("Although Justice O'Connor was not
joined in her opinion by any other member of the Court, the lower courts have almost
universally required plaintiffs to present direct evidence before they will present the jury
with a mixed motive instruction."); Ezra S. Greenberg, Note, Stray Remarks and Mixed-
Motive Cases After Desert Palace v. Costa: A Proximity Test for Determining Minimal
Causation, 29 CARDOZO L. REv. 1795, 1804 n.48 (2008) ("'When a fragmented Court
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices,
the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds,' and [lower courts] considered Justice
O'Connor's concurrence as the narrowest grounds for the Price Waterhouse decision."
(quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977))).
99. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
100. Id. This burden placed on the defendant is greater than the burden placed on the
defendant under the burden-shifting framework outlined in McDonnell Douglas. See Spero,
supra note 95, at 54. The defendant's burden in Price Waterhouse is one of persuasion,
while in McDonnell Douglas it is a burden of production. Id. (explaining that shifting the
burden of persuasion to the defendant to prove that he would have made the same decision
regardless of the plaintiff's protected characteristic is "far more difficult" than simply
articulating a nondiscriminatory reason for his decision as required under McDonnell
Douglas).
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workplace.101 According to the plurality, Justice Byron White, and Justice
O'Connor, an employer may escape all liability even if the employee
proved a protected characteristic was considered in the employment
decision. 102 Congress confronted the Price Waterhouse ruling head on with
the Civil Rights Act of 1991.103 Congress amended Title VII to ensure that
if an employee proved the employer had been motivated by discrimination
in an adverse employment action, the employer would not escape
liability. 10 4
3. The Civil Rights Act of 1991
Because Price Waterhouse limited the protection that Title VII offered
persons in the protected classes, Congress enacted § 107 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991.105 Congress had enacted Title VII in order to prohibit any
"invidious consideration" of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.1
0 6
The outcome of Price Waterhouse "undercut this prohibition" by allowing a
defendant to escape liability even if the plaintiff proved discrimination was
101. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 14-15 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694,
711.
102. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242; id. at 261 n.* (White, J., concurring); id. at 276-
77 (O'Connor, J., concurring). One scholar explains that Price Waterhouse requires "but
for" causation in order to establish a Title VII violation, but the plaintiff does not bear the
burden of proving "but for" causation. See Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment, supra note
96, at 653 ("By proving 'motivating factor' causation, the plaintiff can shift the burden to the
defendant on the issue of 'but for' causation (to prove a lack of 'but for' causation). But if
the defendant prevails on this issue-that is, if there is only 'motivating factor' causation-
then there is no liability. Put simply, Price Waterhouse requires 'but for' causation for
liability, as well as damages." (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring))). Professor Katz argues disparate treatment claimants should not be required to
prove "but-for" causation in order to hold a defendant liable. Id. at 657. According to
Professor Katz, if a plaintiff had to prove "but-for" causation for liability, then a defendant
who had relied in part on discrimination could escape liability. Id. at 658. Professor Katz
argues that "[t]he point of disparate treatment law is to prevent employers from considering
protected factors (such as race or sex) in their decisions; that is, from engaging in
'motivating factor' discrimination." Id. Professor Katz argues that "[v]irtually all disparate
treatment statutes share the same two goals . . . deterrence and compensation.
[A] simple 'but for' requirement undermines these goals, particularly the goal of
deterrence." Id. at 672. Defendants would not be deterred from making employment
decisions that are based in part on age because if they could prove that they would have
made the same decision regardless of the employee's age, then they would not be held liable.
Id. ("[A 'but for'] requirement exonerates defendants who have used protected
characteristics (such as race or sex-or age, disability, or family leave status) in their
decision-making."). Professor Katz argues that the standard of causation outlined in § 107 of
the 1991 Act is a better approach to disparate treatment discrimination cases than McDonnell
Douglas and Price Waterhouse. Id. See supra Part I.C.3 for a full explanation of § 107.
103. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 17, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 710.
104. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), e-5(g)(2)(B) (2006)).
105. H.R. REP.No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 18, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 711 ("The
Court's holding in Price Waterhouse severely undermines protections against intentional
employment discrimination by allowing such discrimination to escape sanction completely
under Title VII.").
106. Id. at 17, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 710.
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a motivating factor in the adverse employment action.10 7 Congress enacted
§ 107 of the 1991 Act in response to Price Waterhouse in order to expand
the protections afforded employees. 108
Section 107 only explicitly amended Title VII, 10 9 codifying the
"motivating factor" mixed-motives analysis outlined by the plurality in
Price Waterhouse, while explicitly rejecting the affirmative defense. 110
Section 107 reads, "Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an
unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors
also motivated the practice.""'i  Thus, § 107 overruled part of the Supreme
Court's decision in Price Waterhouse, because even if an employer proves
107. Id. The House Report from the 1991 Act stated that Price Waterhouse limited
protections for Title VII plaintiffs, explaining, "even if a court finds that a Title VII
defendant has clearly engaged in intentional discrimination, that court is powerless to end
that abuse if the particular plaintiff who brought the case would have suffered the disputed
employment action for some alternative, legitimate reason." Id. at 18, reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 711.
108. Id. at 18, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 711.
109. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 107(a). Although § 107 of the 1991 Act did not
amend the ADEA, § 115 of the 1991 Act did. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 115, 105 Stat. at
1079 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (2006)). Section 115 amended § 7(e) of the ADEA,
changing the two and three year statutes of limitations for filing claims under the ADEA, and
also requiring the EEOC to notify the aggrieved employee if it dismissed his charge. Id. See
Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII, and the Civil Rights Act
of 1991: Three Acts and a Dog That Didn't Bark, 39 WAYNE L. REv. 1093, 1106-25 (1993),
for more information on § 115 and other provisions of the 1991 Act that impliedly modified
the ADEA.
Section 107 similarly did not amend the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), but the
House Report for the 1991 Act stated, "[M]ixed motive cases involving disability under the
ADA should be interpreted consistent with the prohibition against all intentional
discrimination in Section 5 of this Act." H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 4, reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 697. But see John L. Flynn, Note, Mixed-Motive Causation Under the
ADA: Linked Statutes, Fuzzy Thinking, and Clear Statements, 83 GEO. L.J. 2009, 2039-51
(1995) ("The motivating factor amendment itself does not include 'disability' in its
enumerated factors [and] the ADA does not reference the section now containing the
motivating factor amendment .... Finally, the legislative history, while pointing strongly to
a motivating factor interpretation, looks like a suspicious end-run around winning the
amendment's application to the ADA in the statute itself.") Id. at 2051. See infra note 116
for further discussion on the ADA.
110. See Prenkert, supra note 23, at 534-35.
111. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006). The language of § 107 shows that Congress
adopted the plurality's "'motivating factor' analysis" instead of Justice O'Connor's
"substantial factor" analysis. See Klein, supra note 78, at 1184 & n.61; see also Katz,
Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII, supra note 96, at 492 n.8. In addition, Congress did
not specify a heightened standard of evidence when it enacted § 107; it simply stated that an
employee must "demonstrate" that a prohibited characteristic was considered. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(m). In § 104 of the 1991 Act, Congress amended Title VII to include a definition for
"demonstrates," defining it as "meets the burdens of production and persuasion." Id.; see
also Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99 (2003).
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he would have made the same decision regardless of the employee's
protected characteristic, the employer's decision was still unlawful.
112
In addition, through § 107, "Congress converted the 'same decision'
defense . . .from an affirmative defense against liability to a remedy
limitation."'11 3 Congress amended § 706 of Title VII, which outlined
remedies available for plaintiffs."14 According to § 107, a plaintiff is not
entitled to damages if the defendant proved he would have made the same
decision regardless of the illegitimate consideration.11 5 Section 107(b)
states that a court "(i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except
as provided in clause (ii)), and attorney's fees and costs ... ; and (ii) shall
not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission,
reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment .... ., 116
112. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 18, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 711 ("In
providing liability for discrimination that is a 'contributing factor,' the Committee intends to
restore the rule ... that any discrimination that is actually shown to play a role in a contested
employment decision may be the subject of liability."). According to Professor Katz,
"Congress expressly overruled the Price Waterhouse definition of 'because of' .. . [because]
requiring 'but for' causation for liability lets defendants who engaged in 'motivating factor'
discrimination off the hook.... In other words, Congress thought that Price Waterhouse got
the definition of 'because of' wrong-very wrong." Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment,
supra note 96, at 671-72 (footnotes omitted); see also Klein, supra note 78, at 1184-85;
Prenkert, supra note 23, at 534-35.
113. Prenkert, supra note 23, at 534 (footnote omitted).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1)(B); see Prenkert, supra note 23, at 534-35.
115. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(l)(B).
116. Id. One scholar explains that the § 107 provisions use both "but for" causation and
"minimal causation." See Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment, supra note 96, at 652-53.
According to Professor Katz, § 107 outlines a "two-tier causal standard-'motivating factor'
for liability and 'but for' for full damages." Id. at 666. Katz explains that under § 107, the
burden of proof shifts to the defendant to "prove a lack of 'but for' causation." Id. at 653. If
the defendant cannot prove that he would have made the same decision regardless of the
protected characteristic, then the plaintiffs protected characteristic is a "but for" cause. Id.
Only then will a plaintiff be entitled to full damages. Id. Professor Katz points out,
"[A]bsent 'but for' causation, requiring the defendant to compensate the plaintiff for [his]
injuries may provide a windfall to the plaintiff. That is, the plaintiff might be compensated
for injuries [he] would have suffered as a result of another factor-that is, irrespective of the
defendant's act." Id. at 658. Professor Katz argues that § 107's "motivating factor" standard
for liability and "but for" standard for damages is a better causation standard for disparate
treatment statutes than McDonnell Douglas or Price Waterhouse. Id. at 658 & n.61 (noting
shortcomings of § 107 because the costs imposed upon defendants who engage in
"motivating factor" discrimination could be too low to deter discrimination, and plaintiffs'
"moral satisfaction of being vindicated" might not provide an incentive for plaintiffs to
pursue "motivating factor" discrimination cases, but that § 107's framework was better than
McDonnell Douglas or Price Waterhouse). Holding a defendant liable for "motivating
factor" liability is consistent with the purpose of disparate treatment law: "to prevent
employers from considering protected factors.., in their decisions." Id. at 658. Katz goes
on to argue that "[s]ociety, as well as the individual plaintiff, has a strong interest in
deterring 'motivating factor,' as well as 'but for' discrimination." Id. Professor Katz's
article advocates using § 107's framework for other disparate treatment statutes that prohibit
employers from making decisions "because" of a prohibited reason, including the ADA and
§ 704, Title VII's antiretaliation provision. Id. at 644, 647-48 & n.26, 650 n.31. The ADA's
relevant provision states, "No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual
with a disability because of the disability of such individual." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006);
see also Prenkert, supra note 23, at 554 ("[C]ourts have applied the mixed-motives
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Despite the fact that Congress adopted the plurality's "motivating factor"
analysis from Price Waterhouse in § 107, federal courts continued to apply
Justice O'Connor's direct evidence requirement in employment
discrimination cases. 117 In 2003, the Supreme Court abrogated the direct
evidence requirement for Title VII disparate treatment claims when it
handed down its decision in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa. 118
4. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa
In Desert Palace, the Supreme Court addressed whether direct evidence
of discrimination was required for a plaintiff to receive a mixed-motives
jury instruction in a sex discrimination claim brought under Title VII.119
Desert Palace was the first time the Supreme Court interpreted the effect
that § 107 had on Title VII mixed-motives cases. 120 The Court held that
direct evidence was not required for Title VII mixed-motives claims. 121
In Desert Palace, the plaintiff brought claims for sex discrimination and
sexual harassment under Title VII against her employer. 122 The Supreme
Court began its analysis with the statutory text of § 107.123 The Court
determined that Congress's choice of the word "demonstrate" to describe
how the plaintiff must prove discrimination under Title VII was
unambiguous. 124 Congress had defined "demonstrates" in the 1991 Act as
framework to ADA claims. Most apply the Price Waterhouse framework and suffer the
attendant difficulties of distinguishing between direct and circumstantial evidence.... As we
saw with the ADEA, there is substantial variation in the application of the mixed-motives
framework to the ADA and no real opportunity for unification of ADA disparate treatment
law under it."). Title VII's antiretaliation provision states,
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees or applicants ... because he has opposed any practice
made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made
a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
117. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 95 (2003) (collecting cases in which
courts followed Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, requiring direct evidence in order to
obtain a mixed-motive analysis after the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was enacted); see also
Klein, supra note 78, at 1185; supra note 98 and accompanying text.
118. 539 U.S. 90.
119. Id. at 92, 96. The "mixed-motive" instruction refers to instructing the jury that a
defendant will be held liable if the plaintiff can prove that a protected characteristic was a
"motivating factor" in the adverse employment decision, and the burden of persuasion shifts
to the defendant to prove that he would have made the same adverse employment decision
regardless of the plaintiff's protected characteristic, which determines the remedy. Id. at 96-
97.
120. Id. at 98.
121. Id. at 92.
122. Id. at 96.
123. Id. at 98 ("[T]he starting point for our analysis is the statutory text."). See also supra
notes 109-11 and accompanying text for the statutory text of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)
(2006).
124. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 98.
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to "mee[t] the burdens of production and persuasion."' 125  The Court
determined that since there was no heightened evidence requirement in the
statute, a plaintiff should not be required to present direct evidence of
discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motives jury instruction. 126 The
Court further explained that "Congress has been unequivocal when
imposing heightened proof requirements," concluding that Congress would
have expressly stated that direct evidence was necessary for mixed-motive
cases under Title VII. 127
The unanimous Court concluded its opinion by stating "a plaintiff need
only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that 'race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice.""' 128 Justice
O'Connor wrote a brief concurring opinion in which she repeated her
reasoning in Price Waterhouse, but noted that the 1991 Act "codified a new
evidentiary rule for mixed-motive cases arising under Title VII." 129
The impact of the Supreme Court's holding in Desert Palace on ADEA
cases was not uniform among circuit courts. 1 30 After Desert Palace, courts
in the First, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits did not require direct evidence to
shift the burden to the defendant, while courts in the Second, Third, Sixth,
and Eighth Circuits maintained Justice O'Connor's direct evidence
requirement. 131 Before examining this division among the circuit courts, a
brief look at the language the Supreme Court has used in evaluating ADEA
claims is necessary.
125. Id. at 99 (alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)); see also supra
note 111.
126. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 99.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 101. Although the Court held that a plaintiff does not need direct evidence for
a mixed-motive instruction, "Desert Palace did not clarify what level of causation a mixed-
motive employee must show before the burden properly shifts to the employer on the
ultimate issue of 'but for' causation." See Greenberg, supra note 98, at 1806-07.
129. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 102 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
130. See infra Part I.D. The Supreme Court decisions discussed in this Note have all
dealt with jury instructions. Many discrimination cases, including those discussed in Part
I.D, are decided at the summary judgment stage. This is not a significant difference because
the standards should be the same for summary judgment and at trial because "[a]t both stages
the question is the same: is a plaintiff required to meet some sort of 'heightened standard' to
shift the burden of proof to the defendant. The standards to be utilized at trial are equally
applicable at summary judgment." Reply Brief for Petitioner On Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit at 2, Gross v. FBL
Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009) (No. 08-441) (citing Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 101;
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986)). Furthermore, the Supreme Court
does not recognize a distinction between the evidentiary standards for summary judgment
and trial. Id. at 2-3. In Desert Palace, the Supreme Court described the split among circuit
courts and whether or not direct evidence was required in Title VII cases, and in citing cases,
the Court did not distinguish between those at the summary judgment stage and those at trial.
Id. at 3 (citing Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 95).
131. See infra Part I.D.
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5. The U.S. Supreme Court's Treatment of ADEA Claims
Each of the Supreme Court decisions discussed in Part I.C involved Title
VII cases, but lower courts subsequently applied each analysis to ADEA
cases. 132 Prior to Gross, when the Supreme Court addressed ADEA claims,
it had stated that the employer's adverse decision must actually be
motivated by age in disparate treatment claims. 133
In Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 134 the Supreme Court analyzed a claim
for age discrimination brought under the ADEA. 135 The Supreme Court
determined that "there is no disparate treatment under the ADEA when the
factor motivating the employer is some feature other than the employee's
age.' 36  Although there was evidence that the employer had fired the
employee because his pension benefits were close to vesting, the Court
determined that this did not establish a violation of the ADEA. 137 The
Court noted that "a disparate treatment claim cannot succeed unless
the employee's protected trait actually played a role . . . and had a
determinative influence on the outcome." 138  This language is cited in
subsequent ADEA cases as the causation standard. 139
132. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141-42 (2000); see
also supra note 79. The Supreme Court never held that the Price Waterhouse burden-
shifting analysis applied to ADEA cases, but prior to Gross, lower courts consistently
applied the analysis. See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349 ("This Court has never held that this
burden-shifting framework applies to ADEA claims."); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 7-
10, Gross, 129 S. Ct. 2343 (No. 08-441) (explaining that the Supreme Court in Desert
Palace did not address whether the direct evidence requirement from Price Waterhouse
survived outside of Title VII claims and that lower courts apply the Price Waterhouse
analysis to ADEA claims). See also infra Part I.D for lower courts that apply the Price
Waterhouse analysis to ADEA claims. The Supreme Court held in Gross that mixed-
motives claims were not available under the ADEA. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349.
133. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 141.
134. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
135. Id. at 606. The Court noted that the courts of appeals had frequently addressed the
question of whether "an employer violates the ADEA by acting on the basis of a factor, such
as an employee's pension status or seniority, that is empirically correlated with age." Id. at
608.
136. Id. at 609.
137. Id. at 613. The Court noted that the employer could be liable under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006), for interfering
with his pension benefits, but that this did not constitute age discrimination under the ADEA.
Id. at 612.
138. Id. at 610. Different scholars have different interpretations of the causation standard
that this "played a role"/"determinative influence" language created. See Prenkert, supra
note 23, at 549 n.198 (citing different articles in which scholars state that this causation
standard requires "but for" causation, requires less than "but-for" causation, and "tracks the
motivating factor/same decision framework of the 1991 Act").
139. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 141; see also Ky. Ret. Sys. v. EEOC, 128 S. Ct. 2361, 2366
(2008) ("[A] plaintiff alleging disparate treatment cannot succeed unless the employee's age
'actually played a role in that process and had a determinative influence on the outcome'
(quoting Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 610)); Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari at 6, Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009) (No. 08-441) (quoting
same language from Kentucky Retirement Systems).
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In Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 14 0 the Supreme Court
addressed a claim for intentional discrimination brought under the
ADEA. 14 1 The issue before the Court was "whether a plaintiffs prima
facie case of discrimination (as defined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green), combined with sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to
reject the employer's nondiscriminatory explanation for its decision, [was]
adequate to sustain a finding of liability for intentional [age]
discrimination."' 142 According to the Supreme Court, "'liability depends on
whether the protected trait (under the ADEA, age) actually motivated the
employer's decision.' That is, the plaintiff's age must have 'actually played
a role in [the employer's decisionmaking] process and had a determinative
influence on the outcome." ' 143  The Supreme Court determined that "a
plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that
the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to
conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated." 144  The Court
reasoned that because the defendant is in the best position to present
evidence explaining the reasons for its actions, "the trier of fact can
reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is
dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose." 145
Therefore, ADEA plaintiffs must prove that age "'actually played a
role"' and "'had a determinative influence on the outcome"' of an adverse
employment decision. 146 Lower courts have generally applied the Supreme
Court's holding in Price Waterhouse, while quoting the "determinative
influence" language from Reeves, so there was not a notable difference
between the different language used. 147
D. Direct or Circumstantial Evidence: Setting the Stage for Gross v. FBL
Financial Services, Inc.
Prior to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Gross v. FBL Financial
Services, Inc., the availability of mixed-motives claims to ADEA plaintiffs
140. 530 U.S. 133.
141. Id. at 138-41.
142. Id. at 140 (citations omitted).
143. Id. at 141 (alteration in original) (quoting Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 610).
144. Id. at 148.
145. Id. at 147.
146. Id. at 141 (quoting Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 610).
147. See Fasold v. Justice, 409 F.3d 178, 183-84 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating an ADEA
plaintiff had to prove that age "'actually motivated' or 'had a determinative influence on"'
the adverse decision, and then explaining that a plaintiff meets this burden by either
presenting direct evidence of discrimination under Price Waterhouse or indirect evidence
using McDonnell Douglas (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 141)). Professor Prenkert has
argued that the "'played a role/determinative influence' language potentially creates a more
stringent causal standard for disparate treatment claims under the ADEA than does the
motivating-factor language of Price Waterhouse or the 1991 Act." Prenkert, supra note 23,
at 549; see also id. at 549 n.198. However, Professor Zimmer notes there is probably not a
significant difference between the "played a role/determinative influence" standard and the
"motivating factor" standard. Zimmer, supra note 97, at 587.
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went unquestioned, but courts divided over the type of evidence required to
shift the burden of proof. 148
Before Gross, the First, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits did not require direct
evidence of discrimination for an ADEA claimant to receive a mixed-
motives analysis. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that
because there was no heightened direct evidence requirement specified in
the ADEA, direct evidence of discrimination was not required for an ADEA
disparate treatment plaintiff to receive a mixed-motives analysis. 149 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit applied Desert Palace to ADEA
claims, thereby abrogating the direct evidence requirement. 150 In addition,
some district courts in the Seventh Circuit applied Desert Palace to ADEA
claims. 151
On the other hand, the Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits all required
direct evidence of discrimination for an ADEA claimant to receive a mixed-
motives analysis, even after the Supreme Court abrogated the requirement
in Desert Palace. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit required
direct evidence because the Court in Desert Palace had relied on the
language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), which differed from the provisions in
148. See Brief for the United States, supra note 96, at 11 & n.2; see also Reply Brief for
Petitioner at 19, Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009) (No. 08-441); Brief
for Respondent at 50 n.34, Gross, 129 S. Ct. 2343 (No. 08-441); Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari, supra note 132, at 11-23.
149. Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 311 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Tratree
v. BP N. Am. Pipelines, Inc., 277 Fed. App'x 390, 393-95 (5th Cir. 2008) (following Rachid
in ADEA case, noting that the standards of proof for claims of discrimination under the
ADEA and Title VII were treated identically in the Fifth Circuit).
150. Burton v. Town of Littleton, 426 F.3d 9, 19-20 (1st Cir. 2005) ("This court,
following the Supreme Court's command in Desert Palace v. Costa[,] has rejected the
requirement that there be direct evidence in [ADEA] mixed-motive cases; any evidence,
whether direct or circumstantial, may be amassed to show, by preponderance, discriminatory
motive." (citing Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101-02 (2003); Hillstrom v. Best
W. TLC Hotel, 354 F.3d 27, 30-31 (1st Cir. 2003); Beacon Mut. Ins. Co. v. OneBeacon Ins.
Group, 376 F.3d 8, 17 (1st Cir. 2004))); Hillstrom, 354 F.3d at 30-31 (noting that the
Supreme Court's holding in Desert Palace overruled the direct evidence requirement for
mixed-motives analyses where plaintiff brought a claim of gender and age discrimination
under Title VII and the ADEA).
151. Ballatore v. Fairmont Hotels & Resorts, Inc., No. 02 C 4807, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2672, at *22 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 2004) (denying defendant's motion for judgment because
both plaintiffs age and poor job performance could have been factors in the disparate
treatment). But see Lawhead v. Ceridian Corp., 463 F. Supp. 2d 856, 867 (N.D. Ill. 2006)
(noting that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had not applied Desert Palace
to ADEA cases). The Seventh Circuit permitted plaintiffs to proceed under what it termed
the "direct method" of proof, permitting circumstantial evidence to shift the burden of
persuasion to the defendant even before Desert Palace. See Abioye v. Sundstrand Corp., 164
F.3d 364, 369 (7th Cir. 1998) ("Under the mixed motives approach to discrimination cases, a
plaintiff may rely on either direct or circumstantial evidence to establish discriminatory
intent."); see also Ptasznik v. St. Joseph Hosp., 464 F.3d 691, 695 (7th Cir. 2006) ("[The
plaintiff] must put forth evidence that her employer's decision to terminate her had a
discriminatory motivation. She may do so under the direct method by providing direct
evidence ... or by presenting sufficient circumstantial evidence." (citations omitted));
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 132, at 17-19 & n.16 (citing cases from the
Seventh Circuit that did not require direct evidence of discrimination).
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the ADEA. 152 Similarly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
also required direct evidence after Desert Palace. 153 Finally, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also required direct evidence to
shift the burden in ADEA mixed-motives cases. 154
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Gross v. FBL Financial
Services, Inc. to address this split among the circuit courts. 155 Part II of this
Note outlines Gross's factual background, the decisions of the trial court
and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, and the Supreme
Court majority and dissenting opinions. In addition, Part II provides an
overview of lower court cases that have faced ADEA claims post-Gross and
describes the reactions to the Supreme Court's decision.
II. GROSS v. FBL FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.
Part II.A of this Note describes the factual background of Gross and the
Eighth Circuit's opinion. Part II.B outlines the arguments made on appeal
by the petitioner, Gross, and the respondent, FBL. Part II.C discusses the
majority and dissenting opinions in the Supreme Court's decision. Part II.D
provides an overview of ADEA cases after Gross, and Part II.E describes
the reactions to the Supreme Court's holding in Gross.
152. Glanzman v. Metro. Mgmt. Corp., 391 F.3d 506, 512 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that
the 1991 Act's "motivating factor" language did not apply to the ADEA, and therefore
where direct evidence of discrimination was presented in ADEA cases, the Price
Waterhouse framework applied); Cobetto v. Wyeth Pharm., 619 F. Supp. 2d 142, 155-58 &
n. 11 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (recognizing that Desert Palace overruled the direct evidence
requirement in Title VII claims, but concluding that the Court's reasoning in Desert Palace
did not apply to ADEA claims, which were still controlled by Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion in Price Waterhouse in the Third Circuit).
153. See Blair v. Henry Filters, Inc., 505 F.3d 517, 523-24 (6th Cir. 2007) (explaining
that where an ADEA plaintiff presented direct evidence, the burden of persuasion shifted to
the defendant to prove that he would have made the same adverse employment decision
regardless of plaintiff's age, but where plaintiff presented circumstantial evidence of
discrimination, courts used the McDonnell Douglas framework to analyze the claim); Felder
v. Nortel Networks Corp., 187 Fed. App'x 586, 591 (6th Cir. 2006) ("Unlawful
discrimination need not be the only reason for an adverse employment action, but rather
need only be an essential component of an employer's mixed motive. A plaintiff may carry
the burden by introducing direct evidence which shows that in treating a plaintiff adversely
the defendant was motivated by discriminatory intent, or by introducing circumstantial
evidence that supports an inference of discrimination." (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228, 240-41 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Landgraf v. Usi Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 251
(1994))).
154. Graves v. Finch Pruyn & Co., 457 F.3d 181, 187 (2d Cir. 2006) ("Because [the
plaintiff] presents no direct evidence of age discrimination, the court evaluates his ADEA
claim under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.").
155. See 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2346 (2009).
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A. The Road to the Supreme Court
1. Factual Background
Jack Gross began working for a subsidiary of FBL Financial Group in
1971 as a multi-line claims adjuster. 156 After working there for seven
years, he voluntarily left. 157 Gross returned to work for FBL in 1987 as a
claims adjuster and was promoted several times before he reached the
position of Claims Administration Director in 2001.158 In 2003, the Iowa
operations, where Gross worked, merged with the Kansas and Nebraska
operations. 159 Gross, at fifty-four-years-old, was reassigned to the position
of Claims Project Coordinator. 160 FBL created a new position of Claims
Administration Manager, and most of Gross's responsibilities as Claims
Administration Director were transferred to this position.161 FBL gave this
new position to Lisa Kneeskem, a woman in her early forties who had been
working beneath Gross as a subrogation supervisor. 162 Gross, as Claims
Project Coordinator, had the same pay grade and salary points as
Kneeskern, but he believed his reassignment was a demotion "because
Kneeskern assumed the functional equivalent of [his] former position, and
his new position was ill-defined and lacked a job description or specifically
assigned duties." 163
Gross brought a claim of age discrimination under the ADEA against
FBL, alleging FBL demoted him because of his age. 164
2. Procedural Posture
At trial, the judge gave the jury a mixed-motives instruction. 165 The trial
judge instructed the jury that if the plaintiff "proved by any evidence-
direct or otherwise-that age was 'a motivating factor' in the employment
156. Gross v. FBL Fin. Group, Inc., No. 4:04-CV-60209-TJS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
98081, at *5-6 (S.D. Iowa June 23, 2006), rev'd sub. nom., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc.,
526 F.3d 356, 358 (8th Cir. 2008), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009). See also Brief for
Petitioner at 2, Gross, 129 S. Ct. 2343 (No. 08-441). FBL Financial Group is the owner and
manager of insurance and financial services companies. Id.
157. Gross, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98081, at *5-5.
158. Id. at *6-8. Gross had been the Claims Administration Vice President from 1999
until 2001, when his job changed to Claims Administration Director. Brief for Petitioner,
supra note 156, at 2 n. 1. Gross viewed this reassignment as a demotion because his points
for the company's system for salary grades were reduced. Id.; see Gross, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 98081, at *8. This demotion was not at issue in the case. Brief for Petitioner, supra
note 156, at 2 n. 1. For further information regarding Gross's previous positions at FBL, see
Gross, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98081, at *6.
159. Gross, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98081, at *8-9.
160. Id. at *9-10.
161. Id. at *10.
162. Id.
163. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 526 F.3d 356, 358 (8th Cir. 2008), vacated, 129 S.
Ct. 2343 (2009).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 360.
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decision, then the burden shifted to [the employer] to prove that its decision
would have been the same" regardless of the plaintiff's age. 166 The jury
found in favor of Gross and awarded him lost compensation. 167 FBL
appealed the decision, arguing that the jury should not have been given a
mixed-motives instruction because Gross did not present direct evidence of
discrimination. 168 The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the case
because it determined Gross was not entitled to a mixed-motives instruction
because he had not presented direct evidence of discrimination. 169 The
court of appeals noted that Desert Palace abrogated this direct evidence
requirement in Title VII cases but determined that Desert Palace was not
applicable to the ADEA case before it. 170
Gross petitioned the Supreme Court, and the Court granted certiorari on
the question of whether direct evidence was required in order to shift the
burden of persuasion in ADEA mixed-motives cases. 17 1
B. Arguments on Appeal
Gross's merit brief argued various reasons why direct evidence should
not be required for a mixed-motives instruction. 172 For example, Gross
argued that the ADEA did not impose a heightened evidentiary requirement
on plaintiffs, and therefore the Court should not impose one either. 173
166. Id.
167. Id. at 358. The amount of the award was $46,945. Id.
168. Id. FBL also challenged the lower court's decision to exclude testimony, and its
denial of the employer's judgment as a matter of law. Id. These challenges are not relevant
for the analysis of this Note.
169. Id. at 360. The court of appeals noted that the plaintiffs case should have been
analyzed under McDonnell Douglas, with the burden of persuasion remaining with plaintiff
throughout, and that "the jury should have been charged to decide whether the plaintiff
proved that age was the determining factor" in the defendant's adverse employment
decision. Id.
170. Id. at 360-61. According to the court of appeals, Desert Palace did not apply
because the Supreme Court had based its holding on interpreting § 107 of the 1991 Act,
which did not amend the ADEA. Id. at 361-62. The court of appeals pointed out that
another section of the 1991 Act did amend the ADEA. Id. at 361; see also supra note 109.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found this significant because Congress did
not elect to amend the ADEA when it enacted § 107. Gross, 526 F.3d at 361. The court of
appeals determined that it was still bound by Price Waterhouse, noting,
When the Court previously addressed statutory text comparable to the ADEA in
Price Waterhouse-"because of such individual's . . . sex,"--the result was a
fragmented decision from which our court adopted Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion as the controlling rule .... [Tlhe Court [in Desert Palace] did not speak
directly to the vitality of this previous decision, and it continues to be controlling
where applicable.
Id. at 362 (first omission in original) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(l), (2); Desert Palace,
Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98 (2003); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)).
171. Gross, 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2348 (2009).
172. See generally Brief for Petitioner, supra note 156.
173. Id. at 11-13, 16. ("The ADEA does not require a plaintiff (or defendant) to establish
anything by direct evidence, does not bar reliance on circumstantial evidence, and does not
insist on proof by clear and convincing evidence. The Court should not engraft onto the
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Gross cited Price Waterhouse, Desert Palace, and Hazen Paper Co., noting
that in each of these cases, "where the text of the relevant statute does not
specifically impose any elevated evidentiary requirement on a party in civil
litigation, the courts themselves will not do so. The absence of any direct
evidence requirement in the text of the ADEA is thus dispositive in the
instant case." 174 Gross argued that Congress "enact[s] specific language
substituting some other standard" when it wants to depart from established
proof principles in civil cases. 175 Therefore, the Court should not require
direct evidence of discrimination in order to receive a mixed-motives
analysis because Congress did not do so in the ADEA. 176
In addition, Gross argued that requiring direct evidence impeded the
enforcement of the ADEA. 177 Gross noted that the definition of direct
evidence in the court of appeals's opinion in Gross "exclude[d] virtually all
of the types of circumstantial evidence which this Court has recognized can
be probative of a discriminatory intent.' 17 8  If direct evidence, rare in
discrimination cases, was required to shift the burden to the defendant,
Gross argued, "the employer would avoid liability in a substantial number
of cases in which the adverse action would not indeed have otherwise
occurred." 17
9
Gross argued that the court of appeals erroneously relied on Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse as the controlling
opinion. 180 Gross pointed out that both the plurality opinion, in which four
Justices joined, and Justice White's concurring opinion, did not require
direct evidence in order to shift the burden to the defendant.18 1 For this
reason, Gross argued that five Justices in Price Waterhouse voted "for the
rule under which, regardless of whether there is direct evidence, when a
plaintiff proves that an impermissible purpose was 'a motivating factor,' the
defendant bears the burden of showing that it would have made the same
decision in the absence of discrimination."1 82 Therefore, Gross argued, the
ADEA a departure from the conventional standards of litigation which Congress knew how
to-and indisputably did not-include in the language of the statute.").
174. Id. at 17.
175. Id. at 12.
176. Id. at 12-13. Gross argued that only Congress should decide whether to impose
heightened evidentiary standards because "the fashioning of such alternatives, like the
decision to depart at all from the conventional rules of litigation, turns on the types of policy
choices that fall within the unique province of the legislative branch." Id. at 26.
177. Id. at43.
178. Id. at 45-46 (citations omitted) (citing Supreme Court cases that relied upon
discriminatory acts and statements of supervisors who were not involved in making
employment decisions, discriminatory comments made outside the disputed adverse
decision, disparate treatment of female and male job applicants during interviews, and
statistics).
179. Id. at51.
180. Id. at 13, 52-54.
181. Id. at 13-14, 53-54.
182. Id. at 14.
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Supreme Court should hold that direct evidence is not required for ADEA
claimants to receive a mixed-motives instruction. 183
FBL's brief responded to Gross by arguing that the burden of persuasion
should never shift to the employer and that the Court should overrule Price
Waterhouse as applied to the ADEA. 184 FBL contended that the "because
of' language of the ADEA meant "but-for causation." 185 In addition, FBL
argued that the burden of persuasion should remain with the plaintiff
because "one will search in vain for any language in the ADEA purporting
to shift the burden of persuasion to the employer with respect to
causation." 186  According to FBL, since Congress did not "articulat[e] a
departure from the conventional rule allocating to the employee the burden
of persuasion," the Court should not do so either. 187 FBL acknowledged
that the Court chose to impose a burden-shift in Price Waterhouse when
Congress did not articulate one in Title VII, but FBL argued that Price
Waterhouse should be overruled.18 8 FBL noted that the traditional reasons
for overruling precedent weighed in favor of overruling Price
Waterhouse.189 FBL argued that neither the text of the ADEA nor the
common law rules typically applied to civil litigation supported Price
Waterhouse. 190 In addition, FBL argued that Price Waterhouse should be
overruled because "the opinion was splintered and has been difficult to
interpret. . . . [O]verruling Price Waterhouse would bring needed clarity
back to this area of the law rather than upset any settled expectations."' 91
In the alternative, if Price Waterhouse remained good law, FBL argued,
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion should control, and thus the direct
evidence requirement should be retained.192 At the very least, FBL stated,
"Price Waterhouse nonetheless requires that an employee present
183. Id. at 11-14.
184. Brief for Respondent, supra note 148, at 18, 30-32. In his Reply Brief, Gross
argued that whether Price Waterhouse applied to the ADEA was not before the Court, and
therefore the Court should not rule on it. Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 148, at 1-2
(citing cases in which the Court "repeatedly declined to address . . . issue[s] of such
importance when [they are] raised for the first time in respondent's merits brief," and noting
the United States did not have an opportunity to brief the issue). Gross stated that if the
Court were to overrule Price Waterhouse, its impact would reach beyond the ADEA,
including federal and state laws that similarly rely on Price Waterhouse and its burden-
shifling framework. Id. at 2, app. at la-5a (citing state court cases in which Price
Waterhouse was applied to state law claims).
185. Brief for Respondent, supra note 148, at 19 ("FBL believes the phrase ["because
of'] is best interpreted as imposing a common sense but-for causation standard.").
186. Id. at 22.
187. Id. at 26.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 31-32.
190. Id. at 32. FBL further argued, "[t]his was no less true with respect to the text of Title
VII in effect at the time Price Waterhouse was decided." Id.
191. Id. at 33 (citing Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98 (2003); Robert A.
Kearney, The High Price of Price Waterhouse: Dealing with Direct Evidence of
Discrimination, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EM!'. L. 303 (2003); Prenkert, supra note 23, at 532).
192. Id. at 41 ("FBL believes that Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion states the
holding of the Court.").
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substantial evidence of discriminatory intent for the burden to shift to the
employer."' 193 Furthermore, FBL argued that if the burden ever shifted in
ADEA cases, it should only happen under "extraordinary
circumstances,"1 94 namely, where there is "substantial and direct evidence"
of discrimination. 195 According to FBL,
[t]he critical point . . . is that the Price Waterhouse requirement of
substantial and direct evidence in order to shift the burden of persuasion
on an element of an employee's cause of action serves an indispensable
function if the burden is to be shifted at all. The requirement must be
interpreted to have teeth. 196
Finally, FBL argued that Desert Palace does not have an effect on
ADEA claims.197 According to FBL, because the Court in Desert Palace
interpreted § 107, a provision of Title VII, it did not control ADEA
analysis. 198  Therefore, although Desert Palace abrogated the direct
evidence requirement espoused by Justice O'Connor in Price Waterhouse,
FBL argued that this was only for Title VII claims and had no impact on
ADEA claims. 199
C. The Supreme Court Case
1. The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Gross to resolve the conflict that
divided circuit courts: whether direct evidence of discrimination was
required in order to receive a mixed-motives, burden-shifting jury
instruction in cases brought under the ADEA. 200 The Supreme Court did
not decide this issue, however, because it first evaluated whether a mixed-
motives instruction was even available to an ADEA claimant.20 1 The Court
held that a "[mixed-motives] jury instruction is never proper in an ADEA
193. Id. at 42.
194. Id. at 43.
195. Id. at 45. FBL stated that Justice O'Connor did not distinguish between direct and
circumstantial evidence; "[i]nstead, Justice O'Connor required that the evidence relate
directly to the challenged decision." Id. at 43-44.
196. Id. at 45-46. In his Reply Brief, Gross argued that FBL did not set out which
heightened standard of proof the Court should adopt, noting that there were differences
between "substantial evidence" and "direct evidence." Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note
148, at 8-9 ("These standards are different in kind; 'direct evidence' refers to a particular
kind of evidence, while 'substantial evidence' refers to the degree of probativeness of the
evidence.").
197. Brief for Respondent, supra note 148, at 47-50.
198. Id. at 47-48.
199. Id. at 48. FBL also argued that "[t]he evidence at trial simply did not contain facts
sufficient to support a finding that age was a substantial motivating factor in Gross's
demotion." Id. at 56.
200. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2346 (2009).
201. Id. at 2348.
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case. '"202 Therefore, it did not decide whether a plaintiff needed to present
direct evidence. 203
The Court began its analysis by noting, "Title VII is materially different
[from the ADEA] with respect to the relevant burden of persuasion." 20 4
Gross's briefs had relied on the Court's past Title VII decisions, including
Price Waterhouse and Desert Palace, but the Gross majority concluded it
was not controlled by these decisions because of the differences between
the statutes. 20 5 The Court explained that Congress amended Title VII to
"explicitly authoriz[e] discrimination claims in which an improper
consideration was 'a motivating factor' for an adverse employment
decision," 206 but noted that Congress did not similarly amend the ADEA to
provide for motivating factor liability. 20 7
The Court declined to extend the Title VII burden-shifting approach to
claims brought under the ADEA. 208 The Court noted two reasons why it
did not extend the Title VII interpretation to the ADEA. 209 First of all, the
Court reasoned that the language in the ADEA differs from the language in
Title VII because it does not have the provision that permits a finding of
liability where age was a "motivating factor." 210
Second of all, Congress had explicitly amended Title VII to include this
language in the 1991 Act, choosing not to similarly amend the ADEA. 211
Congress had amended the ADEA in other ways when it drafted the 1991
Act.212 The Court found this significant because "[w]hen Congress amends
one statutory provision but not another, it is presumed to have acted
intentionally." 213  Furthermore, the Court explained that this was
particularly significant in the case before it because "'negative implications
raised by disparate provisions are strongest' when the provisions were
202. Id. at 2346.
203. Id. at 2351 n.4. Justice Thomas wrote the opinion for the Court, an opinion that
Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Alito joined. Id. at 2346.
204. Id. at 2348.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 2349 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), e-5(g)(2)(b) (2006); Desert Palace, Inc.
v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94-95 (2003)).
207. Id.
208. Id. ("When conducting statutory interpretation, we 'must be careful not to apply
rules applicable under one statute to a different statute without careful and critical
examination."' (quoting Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 128 S. Ct. 1147, 1153 (2008))).
209. Id.
210. Id. ("Unlike Title VII, the ADEA's text does not provide that a plaintiff may
establish discrimination by showing that age was simply a motivating factor.").
211. Id. Section 107 of the 1991 Act amended Title VII, codifying the "motivating
factor" standard of causation espoused by the Court in Price Waterhouse. See supra note 109
and accompanying text.
212. Id. at 2349 (citing Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 115, 105 Stat.
1071, 1079; Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 302, 105 Stat. at 1088).
213. Id. (citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 256 (1991)) ("We cannot
ignore Congress' decision to amend Title VII's relevant provisions but not make similar
changes to the ADEA."). Justice Stevens acknowledged this in his dissent, noting that
Congress may have intended the Title VII amendments to similarly amend the ADEA. Id. at
2356 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also infra Part II.C.2.
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'considered simultaneously when the language raising the implication was
inserted."' 21 4  Therefore, because the language of the statutes were
different, the majority held that Title VII cases such as Price Waterhouse or
Desert Palace did not control its interpretation of the ADEA. 215
Since the Court determined it was not controlled by previous Title VII
cases, it took a textualist approach, focusing its analysis on the statutory
text of the ADEA, specifically 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). 216 The Court relied
on dictionaries to define the "because of' causation standard, concluding
that "because of' means "'by reason of: on account of.' ' '217
In interpreting 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), the Court stated that, according to
the "plain language of the ADEA," a plaintiff bringing a disparate treatment
claim "must prove that age was the 'but-for' cause of the employer's
adverse decision. '218 The Court held that in an ADEA disparate treatment
case, "the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion to establish that age was
the 'but-for' cause of the employer's adverse action. ' 219 According to the
majority, the burden of persuasion should never shift to the defendant, even
where the plaintiff presented evidence that age partly motivated the
employer's decision. 220 The Court reasoned that because the statutory text
of the ADEA was "'silent on the allocation of the burden of persuasion,"'
the statute should be interpreted using the "'ordinary default rule that
plaintiffs bear the risk of failing to prove their claims.' ' 221
The Court thus rejected Gross's argument that any statutory
interpretation of the ADEA was controlled by the Court's opinion in Price
Waterhouse.222 The Court questioned whether it would even reach the
same conclusion that the Price Waterhouse Court reached in 1989 if it were
ruling on the case today. 223 The Court cited recent opinions in which it
214. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349 (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 330 (1997)).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 2350. "Our inquiry. .. must focus on the text of the ADEA to decide whether
it authorizes a mixed-motives age discrimination claim. It does not." Id. The Court quoted
another Supreme Court opinion, stating "'[s]tatutory construction must begin with the
language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that
language accurately expresses the legislative purpose."' Id. (quoting Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v.
S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252 (2004)). The relevant provision of the
ADEA the Court interpreted was 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). /d; see also Darrell VanDeusen,
Darrell VanDeusen on New Standards in Age Discrimination Litigation: Gross v. FBL Fin.
Services, Inc., 2009 EMERGING ISSUES 4021 (LEXIS), Jul. 15, 2009.
217. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2350 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 194 (1966)) (citing THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 132 (1st ed. 1966); OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 746 (1st ed. 1933)).
218. Id. (citing Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., 128 S. Ct. 2131, 2141-42
(2008); Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 63-64 (2007); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 265 (5th ed. 1984)).
219. Id. at2351.
220. Id. at 2352.
221. Id. at 2351 (quoting Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56 (2005)).
222. Id. at 2351-52.
223. Id. (citing 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1472 (2009); Meacham v.
Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395, 2400-01 (2008) (cases in which the Court took
a textual approach to the ADEA)).
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noted it would not "'introduc[e] a qualification into the ADEA that is not
found in its text"' 224 and that the ADEA "must be 'read . . . the way
Congress wrote it.' 225 The Court also noted the difficulty lower courts had
in instructing juries properly on the shifting burden, stating "even if Price
Waterhouse was doctrinally sound, the problems associated with its
application have eliminated any perceivable benefit to extending its
framework to ADEA claims." 226
The Court noted that Congress should decide whether an employer
should be liable for "motivating factor" discrimination, rather than the
Court.22 7 Congress amended Title VII to hold employers liable for adverse
decisions that were motivated in part by discrimination. 228 Since Congress
did not explicitly amend the ADEA to provide for "motivating factor"
liability, the Court stated, "[w]e must give effect to Congress' choice. '229
Therefore, after Gross, the burden of persuasion never shifts to the
defendant in an ADEA case, even where a plaintiff demonstrates age partly
motivated the defendant. 230
2. The Dissenting Opinions
Justice John Paul Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, which Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Justice David Souter, and Justice Stephen Breyer
joined. 23 1  Justice Stevens believed the majority had "engage[d] in
unnecessary lawmaking" because it answered a question that was not
presented on appeal. 232 As Justice Stevens pointed out, the question the
Court answered was only brought up in FBL's brief, rather than in FBL's
opposition to a petition for certiorari. 233 Justice Stevens disapproved of the
Court's decision to answer a question that was not briefed by the parties or
amici curiae, stating it was "especially irresponsible" to not consider the
U.S. government's view, particularly because this is the agency that
administers the ADEA. 234
224. Id. at 2352 (alteration in original) (quoting 14 Penn Plaza LLC, 129 S. Ct. at 1472).
225. Id. (omission in original) (quoting Meacham, 128 S. Ct. at 2406).
226. Id. (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 839-44 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring);
Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47 (1977)).
227. Id. at 2350 n.3.
228. Id.
229. Id. Justice Stevens, however, argued a different conclusion. See infra notes 247-50
and accompanying text.
230. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2352 ("The burden of persuasion does not shift to the employer
to show that it would have taken the action regardless of age, even when a plaintiff has
produced some evidence that age was one motivating factor in that decision.").
231. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 2353.
233. Id. The respondent's brief asked the Court to "overrule Price Waterhouse with
respect to its application to the ADEA." Brief for Respondent, supra note 148, at 26; see
also Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2353 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
234. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2353 (Stevens, J., dissenting). During the oral argument, the
Government asked that the Court not rule on the issue of whether or not Price Waterhouse
applied to the ADEA. Id. at 2353 n.2.
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Justice Stevens also disagreed with the Court's interpretation of the
"because of" language of the ADEA. 235 For Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, "the most natural reading of ['because of] proscribes
adverse employment actions motivated in whole or in part by the age of the
employee." 236 According to the dissenters, the Supreme Court had already
interpreted "because of" in Price Waterhouse, and the Court in Gross
should not have disregarded this precedent. 237
That the Court is construing the ADEA rather than Title VII does not
justify this departure from precedent. The relevant language in the two
statutes is identical, and we have long recognized that our interpretations
of Title VII's language apply "with equal force in the context of age
discrimination, for the substantive provisions of the ADEA 'were derived
in haec verba from Title VII.' 238
Therefore, in Justice Stevens's view, where age partly motivated an
employer's decision, the decision was "because of' the employee's age. 239
Justice Stevens further pointed out that Congress approved of the Court's
interpretation of the "because of' language in Price Waterhouse.240
Congress adopted the Price Waterhouse plurality's "motivating factor"
causation standard, rejecting "but-for" causation, when it enacted § 107 of
the 1991 Civil Rights Act. 24 1 Justice Stevens noted that the majority acted
"reasonably" in not applying the 1991 Act amendments to the ADEA. 242
However, according to Justice Stevens, the Court "proceed[ed] to ignore the
conclusion compelled by this interpretation of the Act: Price Waterhouse's
construction of 'because of remains the governing law for ADEA
235. Id. at 2353-56.
236. Id. at 2354.
237. Id.
238. Id. (quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985)).
Justice Stevens further noted that Hazen Paper Co. and Reeves "support the conclusion that
the ADEA should be interpreted consistently with Title VII," noting that the Court had
"followed the standards set forth in non-mixed-motives Title VII cases including McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and Tex. Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981)." Id. at 2355 (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141-43 (2000); Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993)).
The majority countered Justice Stevens by stating that "the Court has not definitively
decided whether the evidentiary framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973), utilized in Title VII cases is appropriate in the ADEA context." Id. at 2349-50
n.2 (majority opinion) (citing Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142; O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers
Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311 (1996)). The Court went on to note that the differences in the text
of the ADEA and Title VII precluded the Court from applying Price Waterhouse and Desert
Palace. Id.
239. Id. at 2354-55 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
240. See id. at 2355 ("Congress ratified Price Waterhouse's interpretation of the
plaintiff's burden of proof, rejecting the dissent's suggestion in that case that but-for
causation was the proper standard.").
241. See id. ("The conclusion that 'because of' an individual's age means that age was a
motivating factor in an employment decision is bolstered by Congress' reaction to Price
Waterhouse in the 1991 Civil Rights Act."); see also supra notes 110-12 and accompanying
text.
242. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2356 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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claims." 243 The fact that Congress only amended Title VII meant, for the
dissent, that Price Waterhouse remained good law for the ADEA. 244
Justice Stevens viewed the majority's decision to reject the Price
Waterhouse interpretation as "utter disregard of [the Court's] precedent and
Congress' intent. '245 Justice Stevens pointed out,
As we made clear [in Price Waterhouse], when "an employer considers
both gender and legitimate factors at the time of making a decision, that
decision was 'because of' sex." We readily rejected the dissent's contrary
assertion. "To construe the words 'because of' as colloquial shorthand for
'but-for' causation," we said, "is to misunderstand them."246
While Justice Stevens acknowledged it was reasonable that the Court did
not apply the 1991 Act to the ADEA, he noted "[t]here is . . . some
evidence that Congress intended the 1991 mixed-motives amendments to
apply to the ADEA as well."' 247 He explained, quoting the House Report
forthe 1991 Act,
a "number of other laws banning discrimination, including . . . the
[ADEA] are modeled after and have been interpreted in a manner
consistent with Title VII," and that "these other laws modeled after Title
VII [should] be interpreted consistently in a manner consistent with Title
VII as amended by this Act," including the mixed-motives provisions. 248
Therefore, for Justice Stevens, whether the 1991 Act amendments should
have applied to the ADEA was not clear, but this did not affect his decision
that Price Waterhouse should control the Court's interpretation of the
ADEA language. 249
To further support his contention that Price Waterhouse should control
the Court's interpretation in Gross, Justice Stevens discussed Smith v. City
of Jackson,250 a 2005 ADEA disparate impact case in which the Court
faced a similar situation. 251 In Smith, the Court applied the "pre-1991 [Act]
interpretation of Title VII's identical language" from Wards Cove Packing
243. Id.; see also supra notes 240- 42.
244. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2356 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
245. Id. at 2353.
246. Id. at 2354 (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240-41 (1989)
(plurality opinion), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166,
105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Landgraf v. Usi Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 251 (1994)
(citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 260 (White, J., concurring))).
247. Id. at 2356 n.6.
248. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 696-97); see Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment, supra note 96, at 671.
But see Eglit, supra note 109, at 1168-72 (pointing out that Congress's intent to apply the
amendments to the ADEA "was never reiterated" and "[t]he drafters of the bill actually
enacted made no reference to the impact on the ADEA of the CRA's amendments to Title
Vil").
249. See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2356-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
250. 544 U.S. 228 (2005).
251. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2356 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra note 59 and
accompanying text (describing disparate impact claims of discrimination).
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Co. v. Atonio 252 to an ADEA disparate impact claim. 253 Wards Cove had
been overruled by Congress through § 105 of the 1991 Act, 254 and therefore
Justice Stevens viewed the Smith decision as "precisely on point" in
Gross.255
In Smith, the Court specifically referenced § 105 of the 1991 Act and
acknowledged that it overruled Wards Cove with respect to Title VII
claims.256 The Smith Court also noted, however, that Congress did not
similarly amend the ADEA, concluding that the Court was free to apply
reasoning from Wards Cove to the ADEA case before it. 257 According to
Justice Stevens in Gross, "[i]f the Wards Cove disparate-impact framework
that Congress flatly repudiated in the Title VII context continues to apply to
ADEA claims, the mixed-motives framework that Congress substantially
endorsed surely applies. ' 258 Therefore, Justice Stevens and the dissenters
believed that "motivating factor" causation was the appropriate standard for
ADEA disparate treatment claims. 2 59
In his dissent, Justice Stevens answered the question for which the Court
granted certiorari. 260 Justice Stevens would follow Desert Palace and hold
that direct evidence is not required for mixed-motives claims brought under
the ADEA. 26 1 According to the dissent, Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion in Price Waterhouse was not the controlling opinion; therefore
direct evidence should not be required. 262 The dissent explained that lower
courts treated Justice O'Connor's opinion as controlling,
252. 490 U.S. 642 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003).
253. Smith, 544 U.S. at 240.
254. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 105 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)
(2006)); see also Prenkert, supra note 60, at 219, 231-32.
255. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2356 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
256. Smith, 544 U.S. at 240.
257. Id.; see also Prenkert, supra note 60, at 243. Prenkert described the Supreme
Court's holding in Smith as "Bizarro statutory stare decisis" because the Court "relied on its
congressionally overridden interpretation of Title VII in Wards Cove to structure important
aspects of the ADEA [disparate] impact analysis." Id. For a full discussion of Smith and the
Court's resurrection of Wards Cove, see Prenkert, supra note 23, at 544-47.
258. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2356 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Gross majority addressed the
Smith decision, but reached a different conclusion than Justice Stevens. Id. at 2351 n.5
(majority opinion). The majority concluded that because Congress added the "motivating
factor" language to Title VII in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), mixed-motives claims had not
previously been available to Title VII claimants based on its original language. Id.
According to the majority, "[i]f such 'motivating factor' claims were already part of Title
VII, the addition of [42 U.S.C.] § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) alone would have been sufficient." Id.
To combat the majority's argument, Justice Stevens noted, "Congress emphasized in passing
the 1991 Act that the motivating-factor test was consistent with its original intent in enacting
Title VII." Id. at 2356 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (listing various examples
from the legislative history).
259. Id. at 2356 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
260. Id. at 2357.
261. Id.
262. Id.
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in light of [the Court's] statement in Marks v. United States, that "[w]hen
a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the
result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds.' 263
According to Justice Stevens, Justice O'Connor's opinion should not have
been treated as controlling. 264 Rather, Justice Stevens stated that Justice
White's concurring opinion controlled Price Waterhouse because Justice
White's opinion supported the plurality's motivating factor test. 265 Justice
Stevens noted that Justice White's concurring opinion differed from the
plurality's with respect to the type of evidence an employer must present to
prove the affirmative defense. 266 Therefore, Justice Stevens concluded that
because "Justice White provided a fifth vote for the 'rationale explaining
the result' of the Price Waterhouse decision, his concurrence is properly
understood as controlling, and he, like the plurality, did not require the
introduction of direct evidence." 267
Finally, Justice Stevens stated that the Court's Desert Palace analysis
"applie[d] with equal force to the ADEA.' ' 268 The Court in Desert Palace
evaluated whether Title VII imposed a heightened evidentiary standard and
found that it did not.269  Justice Stevens noted, "As with the 1991
amendments to Title VII, no language in the ADEA impose[d] a heightened
direct evidence requirement. '2 70 Justice Stevens pointed to Supreme Court
cases in which the Court refused to impose special evidentiary requirements
in ADEA cases. 2 71  Therefore, Justice Stevens concluded, an ADEA
plaintiff did not need to present direct evidence of discrimination in order to
receive a mixed-motives instruction. 272
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg, filed a
brief dissenting opinion as well. 273 Justice Breyer wrote to express his
disagreement with the "but-for" causation standard espoused by the
majority. 274 For Justice Breyer, "to apply 'but-for' causation [where the
employer had multiple motives for the adverse action] is to engage in a
263. Id. (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)).
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. See supra note 97 for more information on Justice White's concurring opinion.
267. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2357 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Marks, 430 U.S. at 193).
268. Id. at 2358.
269. See supra notes 119-29 and accompanying text for the Court's analysis in Desert
Palace.
270. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2358 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
271. Id. Justice Stevens pointed to Hazen Paper Co., stating that the Court "held that an
award of liquidated damages for a 'willful' violation of the ADEA did not require proof of
the employer's motivation through direct evidence." Id. (citing Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,
507 U.S. 604, 615 (1993)).
272. Id. at 2358.
273. Id. at 2358 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
274. Id.
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hypothetical inquiry about what would have happened if the employer's
thoughts and other circumstances had been different. ' 275 Justice Breyer
believed that if a plaintiff can prove that age was one of the reasons for the
employer's action, he has established that the decision was "because of'
age. 276 Justice Breyer, however, stated, "the law need not automatically
assess liability in these circumstances," and pointed to the employer's
affirmative defense outlined in Price Waterhouse.277 Justice Breyer could
"see nothing unfair or impractical about allocating the burdens of proof in
this way" 278 because the employer would be in a better position to prove
the "hypothetical situation" of how the employer would have acted.279
Gross is an important case for parties litigating under the ADEA. With
its decision, the Supreme Court has taken away a framework upon which
lower courts had frequently relied in analyzing ADEA cases. 280 Part II.D
provides an overview of ADEA disparate treatment cases that were decided
immediately after Gross.
D. Post-Gross Cases
After the Supreme Court's decision in Gross, ADEA claimants no longer
have access to the burden-shifting, "motivating factor" analysis set out in
Price Waterhouse. Whether McDonnell Douglas applies to ADEA cases
was a question left open by the Court, 281 thus, there is confusion in lower
courts over whether the McDonnell Douglas framework continues to apply
to ADEA cases after Gross.
Some federal district courts have continued to analyze disparate
treatment claims brought under the ADEA using the McDonnell Douglas
framework. Federal courts note that the Supreme Court in Gross explicitly
stated that it had applied McDonnell Douglas to ADEA cases, but that it
never definitively held that McDonnell Douglas applied to ADEA cases. 282
Most federal courts continue to follow precedent in their circuits after
Gross, applying McDonnell Douglas to ADEA cases. 283
275. Id. at 2359.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. ("[I]t makes sense that this would be an affirmative defense, rather than part of
the showing of a violation, precisely because the defendant is in a better position than the
plaintiff to establish how he would have acted in this hypothetical situation.").
280. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
281. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349 n.2 (majority opinion); see also supra note 238.
282. E.g., Guinto v. Exelon Generation Co., No. 08-2191, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 18447,
at *1 1 n.2 (7th Cir. Aug. 18, 2009); Fuller v. Seagate Tech., LLC, No. 08-cv-00656-CMA-
CBS, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73422, at *24 n.9 (D. Colo. Aug. 19, 2009); Woehl v. Hy-Vee,
Inc., No. 4:08-CV-00019-JAJ, 2009 WL 2105480, at *5 (S.D. Iowa July 10, 2009); see also
supra note 238.
283. See, e.g., Guinto, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 18447, at *10-11 & n.2 (applying the
McDonnell Douglas framework to an ADEA case because the Seventh Circuit frequently
applied it, noting that the Supreme Court never definitively decided whether the McDonnell
Douglas framework applied to ADEA cases) ("To prevail on an ADEA claim, a plaintiff
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In Woehl v. Hy-Vee, Inc.,2 84 the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Iowa faced a claim for age discrimination under the ADEA.2 85
The district court noted that, after Gross, the Price Waterhouse burden-
shifting instruction was not available to ADEA claimants, 286 and the court
questioned whether McDonnell Douglas still applied to ADEA cases. 2 87 In
Woehl, the court evaluated the plaintiffs claim twice, first using the
McDonnell Douglas framework, 2 88 and second without shifting the burden
of production to the defendant. 2 89 The court held that the plaintiffs claim
did not survive summary judgment under either analysis. 290
In Bell v. Raytheon Co.,29 1 the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Texas faced three plaintiffs alleging age discrimination under the
'must prove that age was the 'but-for' cause of the employer's adverse decision.' At the
summary-judgment stage, however, the plaintiff only needs to create a genuine issue as to
whether the employer discriminated against him on the basis of his age." (quoting Gross,
129 S. Ct. at 2350)); Fuller, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73422, at *24 n.9 ("Justice Thomas
pointed out that the Supreme Court has not 'definitively decided whether' the McDonnell
Douglas framework applies in ADEA cases. Nonetheless, this Court finds nothing in Justice
Thomas' opinion that would alter the widespread use of the McDonnell Douglas framework
to decide whether summary judgment is appropriate in ADEA cases." (quoting Gross, 129 S.
Ct. at 2349 n.2) (citing Martino v. MCI Commc'ns. Servs., Inc., 574 F.3d 447 (7th Cir.
2009); Misner v. Potter, No. 2:07-CV-330 CW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55147, at *2 n.2 (D.
Utah June 26, 2009))); Jackson v. Lakewinds Natural Foods, No. 08-398 (JNE/JJG), 2009
WL 2255286, at *3 n.4 (D. Minn. July 28, 2009) (noting the uncertainty after Gross of
whether McDonnell Douglas applied to ADEA cases, but applying it because the Eighth
Circuit had done so previously and because the parties had analyzed the plaintiff's claim
using the framework in their memoranda); Wagner v. Geren, No. 8:08 CV 208, 2009 WL
2105680, at *4-5 (D. Neb. July 9, 2009) (noting that after Gross, mixed-motives claims
were not available under the ADEA and that it was unclear whether McDonnell Douglas
applied to ADEA claims, but holding that it did not matter "because [plaintiff had] not
presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable finder of fact could conclude that his
age was the 'but-for' cause of any adverse employment action," and therefore granting
summary judgment for defendant); Miller v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., No. 3:07-CV-943 (JCH),
2009 WL 1939808, at *6 n.4 (D. Conn. July 6, 2009) ("In its recent decision in Gross, the
Supreme Court noted that the Court 'has not definitively decided' whether the McDonnell
Douglas framework, first developed in the context of Title VII cases, 'is appropriate in the
ADEA context.' In the absence of further direction from the Supreme Court, this court must
follow Second Circuit precedent, which applies the McDonnell Douglas framework to
ADEA claims." (quoting Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349 n.2) (citing D'Cunha v. Genovese/Eckerd
Corp., 479 F.3d 193, 194-95 (2d Cir. 2007))).
284. 2009 WL 2105480.
285. Id. at * 1.
286. Id. at *4.
287. Id. at *5.
288. Id.
289. Id. at *8-9 ("The Supreme Court [in Gross] stated that the plaintiff retains the
burden of persuasion to establish that age was the 'but-for' cause of the employer's adverse
action in an ADEA action. Thus, if McDonnell Douglas were not applicable in this matter,
the burden would not shift to [defendant] at any point in the analysis." (citing Gross v. FBL
Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2351 (2009))).
290. Id. at *9. The plaintiff only presented evidence that she was replaced by a younger
worker. Id. The court held that this piece of evidence alone was "insufficient to create a
genuine issue of material fact as to 'the reason the employer decided to act."' Id. (quoting
Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2350).
291. No. 3:08-CV-0702-G, 2009 WL 2365454 (N.D. Tex. July 31, 2009).
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ADEA. 292 The district court questioned whether the McDonnell Douglas
framework still applied to the ADEA after the Court's holding in Gross.29 3
The court ultimately decided to analyze the plaintiffs' claims using
McDonnell Douglas because, first, the Supreme Court had previously
applied McDonnell Douglas to ADEA cases and, second, courts in the Fifth
Circuit had consistently applied it to ADEA claims. 294 However, the court
altered the framework to account for the Gross holding, stating, "the court
will not shift the burden to the defendant to articulate a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason unless the plaintiffs show that age was the but-for
cause of any adverse employment actions. ' 295  Once the plaintiffs
established the prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, the court
evaluated whether they had established that age was the "but-for" cause for
the defendant's decision. 296 The evidence the plaintiffs presented was not
"sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact"; therefore the court
granted summary judgment for the defendant. 297  The court noted,
"Although the plaintiffs have stated a prima facie case of age
discrimination, the court need not reach stage two [of the McDonnell
Douglas framework] because the plaintiffs have not shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that age was the but-for cause of [the
adverse acts]." '298
Thus, lower courts have taken different approaches to analyzing ADEA
disparate treatment claims after Gross. Part III.A.2 discusses further the
varying approaches and the effect Gross has had on McDonnell Douglas.
Before analyzing the implications of Gross, Part lI.E provides an overview
of the reactions to the Court's holding in Gross.
E. Reactions to the Court's Decision
Employers predictably applauded the Supreme Court's holding in
Gross,29 9 while others have criticized the decision because an employee
292. Id. at *1. The plaintiffs also brought age discrimination claims under the state
provision, but that is not relevant for the purpose of this discussion.
293. Id. at *4-5.
294. Id. at *5.
295. Id.
296. Id. at *6-7. ("Thus, the court will assume that Cox's facts set forth a prima facie
case of age discrimination. Nonetheless, the court will not yet proceed to stage two.
Although the plaintiffs have sufficient evidence to demonstrate the four elements laid out
above, they still must demonstrate that age was the but-for cause of Raytheon choosing
Rogers over Cox.").
297. Id. at *8. ("The plaintiffs have presented a series of remarks, none of which is in
temporal proximity-or in any other way related-to the decision not to hire Cox.
Moreover, the plaintiffs do not allege that the business practices they cite.., were in any
way related to the decision to hire Cox.").
298. Id.
299. David G. Savage, Age Bias Much Harder To Prove: The Supreme Court Shifts the
Burden of Proof to the Worker Making the Claim. Businesses Cheer, L.A. TIMES, June 19,
2009, at Al (noting that "[b]usinesses applauded" the Court's decision in Gross).
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must now make a higher showing in order to establish an age discrimination
claim. 300
Under the Court's holding in Gross, the burden of persuasion never shifts
to the employer, even if the plaintiff proves age partly motivated the
employer.301 Rather, the plaintiff must prove his age was the "but-for"
cause of the adverse decision. 302  This is a 'significant and marked
change"' from the previous approach 303 and "a significant victory for
employers. '30 4 Now that the burden of persuasion never shifts to the
defendant, "employers need only show that there were other factors-
workplace reorganization, the employee's work record, financial
considerations, etc.-affecting their decision. '30 5  This showing is easier
for employers than proving they would have made the same decision
regardless of the employee's age. 30 6  One article states, "Businesses
applauded the decision in [Gross], saying employers sometimes settle weak
claims to avoid battling before a jury over the real reasons behind a
layoff."' 30 7 Anjana Samant, a lawyer for the Center for Constitutional
Rights, pointed out that "[w]hichever party [does not] have the burden of
proof is more likely to win," noting that Gross may thus have an impact on
whether plaintiffs file lawsuits at all. 308
300. The Chairman of the House Education and Labor Committee, Representative George
Miller, stated that the Court's ruling in Gross "will make it even more difficult for workers
to stand up for their basic rights in the workplace. A narrow majority of the Supreme Court
has once again overturned decades of precedent and congressional intent and sided with
powerful corporate interests on a workplace discrimination case." Press Release, Committee
on Education and Labor, Congress To Hold Hearing on Supreme Court's 'Gross' Ruling
Regarding Age Discrimination, Says Chairman Miller (June 30, 2009), available at
http://edlabor.house.gov/newsroom/2009/06/congress-to-hold-hearing-on-su.shtml
[hereinafter Press Release]. Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman, Patrick Leahy, stated
with respect to the Court's decision in Gross, "five justices acted to disregard precedent and
ignore the plain reading and common understanding of the statute that Congress passed to
protect Americans from discrimination based on their age." Comment of Senator Patrick
Leahy, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, on the Supreme Court's 5-4 Ruling in Gross
v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. (June 18, 2009), http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200906/
061809c.html.
301. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2352 (2009).
302. Id.
303. See Savage, supra note 299 (quoting corporate defense attorney Diana Hoover).
304. James 0. Castagnera, Patrick J. Cihon, Andrew P. Morriss, Supreme Court EEO
Decisions Present Mixed Results for Employers, 25 TERMINATION OF EMP. BULL., July 2009,
at 1,2.
305. Id.
306. See supra notes 90-91, 100 and accompanying text.
307. Savage, supra note 299. Karen Hared, the executive director of the National
Federation of Independent Business, stated that small businesses are in favor of the Court's
decision. Id. Hamed believes that "employers should not have to defend themselves in court
'based on speculative evidence that age was merely a motivating factor in an employer's
decision."' Id.
308. Supreme Court Makes It Harder To Prove Age Discrimination, THE HUFFINGTON
POST, June 18, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/06/19/supreme-court-makes-it-
ha n_217915.html.
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Conversely, advocates of older workers are opposed to the Court's
holding in Gross because ADEA plaintiffs must now prove age was the
"but-for" cause to establish a violation, which is a higher standard than
"motivating factor" causation. 30 9  AARP Executive Vice President of
Social Impact, Nancy LeaMond, stated, "It will now be harder for age-
discrimination victims to prove their claims under the [ADEA]. The timing
of this decision could not be worse-in the midst of a severe recession, with
layoffs falling hard on older workers. ' 310 An article from the Los Angeles
Times, reporting on Gross and the reactions to the decision, cites analysts
who claim that it will be difficult for ADEA plaintiffs to obtain evidence
that age was the reason behind an employer's adverse decision. 311 These
analysts note, "[W]orkers claiming such discrimination almost certainly
will not be present while their employers discuss laying them off or
demoting them." 312
In addition, one commentator noted that Gross does not serve the
deterrent purpose of the ADEA, 313 stating, "[m]ixed-motive analysis serves
as an important deterrent to employers who might otherwise permit
improper motives to infect their decision-making processes-and as a
deterrent, it may affect, and protect, numerous employees." 314
One commentator notes the potential impact Gross may have on jury
instructions in cases where the plaintiff alleges discrimination under both
Title VII and the ADEA. 315 Darrell VanDeusen, a labor and employment
lawyer, observes that because the burdens of proof after Gross differ for
Title VII and ADEA claims, juries will have to be instructed on the two
standards and "[t]his arguably amplifies the difficulty [of instructing juries
on the mixed-motives burden-shifting framework], instead of ameliorating
it."' 316 VanDeusen adds, "the jury will be tasked with parsing out the
evidence to determine if the plaintiff has met his burden with respect to the
ADEA claims, and for Title VII claims, determining if the defendant-
employer has met its." '317
309. See supra Part II.C. Corporate defense attorney Diana Hoover stated that Gross
"imposes a difficult burden on the employee." Savage, supra note 299.
310. Nancy LeaMond, Letter to the Editor, Setback for Older Workers, N.Y. TIMES, July
14, 2009, at A24. The fact that the burden of proof remains with the plaintiff is significant
because, as one commentator noted, "proof structures... often make or break an employee's
case." Joanna L. Grossman, The Supreme Court Curtails Federal Protection Against Age
Discrimination, June 25, 2009, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20090625.html.
311. Savage, supra note 299.
312. Id.
313. See supra notes 35-36, 102 and accompanying text.
314. Grossman, supra note 310.
315. See VanDeusen, supra note 216, at 13.
316. Id.
317. Id.
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Many critics of Gross compare the decision to a 2007 Supreme Court
decision 318 that limited protections for victims of pay discrimination. 319 In
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,320 the Supreme Court held that
the statutory period for bringing a Title VII pay discrimination claim began
when the act occurred, rather than each time a paycheck was issued. 321 As
a result, the Court held that the plaintiffs claim for discrimination was
time-barred. 322 Congress passed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009
to overrule Ledbetter in order to increase employee protections. 323 One
labor and employment attorney has noted the similarities between Ledbetter
and Gross, stating that in both cases the Court interpreted the plain text of
the statute "to deny a discrimination plaintiff the ability to more readily
prove his or her case."' 324 Critics of Gross note it is possible that Congress
will similarly act to overrule the Gross decision. 325 According to one
commentator, "[a] like-minded Congress and Administration have already
demonstrated a willingness to amend legislation to create a more
'employee-friendly' atmosphere, such as the passing of the Lily [sic]
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act earlier this year. There seems no reason to think
318. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by
statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.).
319. Id. at 641-43. Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman, Patrick Leahy, commented,
"f[the decision [in Gross] reminds me of the Court's wrong-headed ruling in Ledbetter. In
fact, it was these same five justices who misconstrued an employment discrimination statute
in that case." See Comment of Senator Patrick Leahy, supra note 300; see also Tiffany G.
Hildreth, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back-Congress and the Supreme Court Take Turns
Leading the Employment Law Dance, LAB. & EMP. NEWSL. (Strasburger & Price, LLP,
Austin, Tex.), June 23, 2009, at 3, available at http://www.strasburger.com/calendar/
news/labor/Gross-v-FBL-Financial-Services.pdf (drawing parallels between Gross and
Ledbetter).
320. 550 U.S. 618.
321. Id. at 628 ("The EEOC charging period is triggered when a discrete unlawful
practice takes place. A new violation does not occur, and a new charging period does not
commence, upon the occurrence of subsequent nondiscriminatory acts that entail adverse
effects resulting from the past discrimination.").
322. Id. at 628-29. The Court stated, "Ledbetter should have filed an EEOC charge
within 180 days after each allegedly discriminatory pay decision was made and
communicated to her. She did not do so, and the paychecks that were issued to her during
the 180 days prior to the filing of her EEOC charge do not provide a basis for overcoming
that prior failure." Id.
323. Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.). Under the Fair Pay Act, "an unlawful employment practice
occurs ... when a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice is adopted ... or
when an individual is affected by application of a discriminatory compensation decision or
other practice, including each time wages, benefits, or other compensation is paid." § 3, 123
Stat. at 5-6 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(A)). See Jason R. Bent, What the
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act Doesn't Do: "Discrete Acts" and the Future of Pattern or
Practice Litigation, 33 RUTGERS L. REc. 31 (2009), available at http://www.lawrecord.com/
files/bent.pdf, for more information on the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act.
324. Hildreth, supra note 319, at 3.
325. See Press Release, supra note 300 ("Like with the Lilly Ledbetter case, Congress
may be forced to clarify the law's intent so we can prevent the damage this decision will
have on workers' civil rights.").
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similar action will not happen here." 32 6 Congress announced two weeks
after Gross was decided that it would hold a hearing to examine how the
decision will impact employees' protections against age discrimination and
other workplace discrimination. 327
At the very least, Congress will examine the impact of Gross.328 Part III
of this Note urges Congress to act and amend the ADEA to permit mixed-
motives cases. Specifically, Part III suggests that Congress amend the
ADEA to include language identical to § 107 of the 1991 Act so that ADEA
disparate treatment claims will be interpreted consistently with Title VII
claims.
III. CONGRESS SHOULD AMEND THE ADEA To INCLUDE § 107
Whether Price Waterhouse should have controlled the Court's
interpretation of the ADEA in Gross is not an easy question. 329 Part III of
this Note will not repeat the Justices' efforts in analyzing whether precedent
and congressional intent make mixed-motives claims available under the
ADEA. 330 Rather, Part III looks to the future of ADEA disparate treatment
law and urges Congress to take action to amend the ADEA to include the
"motivating factor" standard of causation and the limited remedies available
to plaintiffs that are available to Title VII plaintiffs through § 107. Before
explaining the reasons why Congress should amend the ADEA, this Note
explores the questions left in the wake of Gross.
326. VanDeusen, supra note 216, at 13-14; see also Prenkert, supra note 23, at 563-64
(urging congressional action to make mixed-motives claims uniform across
antidiscrimination statutes and noting that Congress had introduced the Fair Pay Act in
response to Ledbetter, thus showing Congress might amend civil rights laws).
327. Press Release, supra note 300.
328. Id. ("The court's ruling was unacceptable, and this Congress will work to protect all
Americans' ability to be treated fairly on the job. Employment decisions should be based on
merit, not prejudice.").
329. Numerous articles have been written about ADEA disparate treatment law and the
different standards of causation used. See, e.g., Prenkert, supra note 23, at 543-44 ("Price
Waterhouse has been applied outside the Title VII context where it was initially crafted;
however, . . . its application is much less uniform. In fact, the application of the mixed-
motive framework has been so inconsistent that I call it the mixed-motives mess."); Prenkert
supra note 60, at 223, 255-63 (noting the confusion surrounding ADEA mixed-motives
claims).
330. For the majority, because Congress codified the Price Waterhouse plurality's
"motivating factor" causation standard and rejected its affirmative defense by amending
Title VII with § 107, this meant that Congress intended "motivating factor" causation to be
available only for Title VII disparate treatment claimants. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129
S. Ct. 2343, 2349 (2009); supra notes 211-15 and accompanying text. For the dissent,
however, this meant Congress intended "because of' to mean "motivating factor," and
therefore this definition should apply to the ADEA. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2353-54 (Stevens,
J., dissenting); supra notes 240-50 and accompanying text.
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A. Questions After Gross
1. How Far Does Gross Reach?
The Court's holding in Gross leaves open a few questions. First of all,
Gross may have an effect on other antidiscrimination statutes that use the
same "because of' language as the ADEA and Title VII. 331 In particular,
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits discrimination
"because of' an individual's disability, and the statute was not amended by
§ 107.332 Based on the Court's reasoning in Gross, mixed-motives
instructions should not be available under the ADA because the statute does
not provide for "motivating factor" liability, nor did Congress explicitly
amend the ADA when it amended Title VII through § 107. 333 However,
there is language in the House Report on the 1991 Act that indicates
Congress intended mixed-motives claims to be available under the ADA. 334
Furthermore, the Court's holding in Gross has already extended beyond
antidiscrimination statutes. 335  In a recent case brought under the Jury
Systems Improvement Act (Juror Act), 336 the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia relied on Gross to determine the burden of proof a
Juror Act plaintiff carried. 337 The district court reasoned that because the
Juror Act's "by reason of' language 338 is similar to the ADEA's "because
of' language, the plaintiff had to establish that her jury service was the
331. Barry A. Guryan, CLIENT ALERT, Supreme Court Applies More Stringent 'But For'
Standard of Proof in Age Cases in Gross v. FBL Financial Services 2 (Epstein Becker
Green), June 2009, available at http://www.ebglaw.com/files/29455_ClientAlertGross.pdf;
see supra note 116; see also supra note 184; Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 148, at 2,
app. at 1 a-5a (citing cases in which Price Waterhouse was applied to state law claims).
332. Guryan, supra note 331, at 2; see also supra notes 109, 116.
333. See supra note 116. For further discussion of mixed-motives claims and the ADA,
see Prenkert, supra note 23, at 552-54 and Flynn, supra note 109.
334. See supra note 109. But see Flynn, supra note 109, at 2046 (explaining that the
legislative history is not convincing on the issue of whether the causation standard under the
ADA should be "motivating factor" liability as set out in § 107 of the 1991 Act).
335. Williams v. District of Columbia, No. 07-505 (RMC), 2009 WL 2568011 (D.D.C.
Aug. 21, 2009); see also Posting of Jordan Weissmann to The Blog of Legal Times,
http://Iegaitimes.typepad.com/blt/2009/08/high-court-ruling-on-age-discrimination-decides-
juror-rights-case-.html (Aug. 21, 2009, 15:22 EST) (noting the district court's opinion in
Williams was "a sign of how far a recent Supreme Court decision on age discrimination
could reach into labor law").
336. 28 U.S.C. § 1875 (2006). The relevant provision states, "No employer shall
discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any permanent employee by reason of
such employee's jury service, or the attendance or scheduled attendance in connection with
such service, in any court of the United States." Id. § 1875(a).
337. Williams, 2009 WL 2568011, at *7 ("The Supreme Court's decision in Gross v. FBL
Financial Services clarifie[d plaintiffs] burden of proof."). The plaintiff alleged that she
had been "excess[ed]" because she had served jury duty for four months. Id. at *1. The court
explained that to "excess" a worker was to transfer her to another job location. Id. at *3. The
court noted that the case was "a close case of mixed motives." Id. at * 1.
338. According to the court, the Juror Act "prohibits an employer from taking an adverse
action against an employee 'by reason of that employee's federal jury service." Id. at *6
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1875(a)).
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"but-for" cause of the adverse action. 339 The court noted that it "ha[d] no
doubt that [plaintiffs] jury service was a motivating factor behind [the
adverse action]," 340 but that "motivating factor" causation was not
sufficient to establish a claim under the Juror Act after Gross.34 1 The court
stated, "Thus, under Gross, [plaintiff] must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that she was 'excessed' 'by reason of' her jury service-that is,
that jury service was the 'but-for' cause of the decision to excess her." 342
The district court held that the plaintiff had not established a claim under
the Juror Act because she did not prove that her jury service was the "but-
for" cause of the adverse action.34 3
The full impact of Gross is still uncertain because the decision is still
new. 344 However, in just a few short months the Supreme Court's decision
has already reached beyond the ADEA. Whether Gross will eliminate
ADA mixed-motives claims remains to be seen, but if courts follow the
reasoning in Williams, it is likely that ADA plaintiffs will not establish
violations by proving motivating factor causation.
2. Does Gross Affect McDonnell Douglas?
The Court also left open the question of whether the framework outlined
in McDonnell Douglas applies to the ADEA. 345 The Court had previously
applied the McDonnell Douglas approach to ADEA cases, but it never
339. Id.
340. Id. at *7.
341. Id. at *6 ("'Unlike Title VII, [the Juror Act's] text does not provide that a plaintiff
may establish discrimination by showing that [jury service] was simply a motivating
factor."' (alterations in original) (quoting Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343,
2351 (2009))).
342. Id.
343. Id. at *6-7. But see Hunter v. Valley View Local Sch., No. 08-4109, 2009 U.S.
App. LEXIS 19141 (6th Cir. Aug. 26, 2009). In Hunter, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit faced a retaliation claim brought under the Family and Medical Leave Act of
1993 (FMLA). Id. at *7. The court noted that analysis of FMLA retaliation claims had often
previously mirrored Title VII claims, but that the Supreme Court in Gross "reminded us that
its Title VII decisions do not automatically control the construction of other employment
discrimination statutes." Id. The Court of Appeals interpreted the language of the FMLA
because "Gross ... requires us to revisit the propriety of applying Title VII precedent to the
FMLA by deciding whether the FMLA, like Title VII, authorizes claims based on an adverse
employment action motivated by both the employee's use of FMLA leave and also other,
permissible factors." Id. at *8. The court concluded that the FMLA permitted these claims
because one of the implementing regulations for the FMLA states, "'employers cannot use
the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment actions."' Id. at *9-10
(quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) (2008)) ("We have already held that § 825.220(c) is a
reasonable interpretation of the FMLA entitled to deferential judicial review."). According
to the court, the use of "[tihe phrase 'a negative factor' envisions that the challenged
employment decision might also rest on other, permissible factors." Id. at *10. Therefore the
court concluded that it could continue to apply Price Waterhouse's burden-shifting
framework to FMLA retaliation claims. Id.
344. The decision was handed down on June 18, 2009. Gross, 129 S. Ct. 2343.
345. See supra note 238.
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definitively held that the framework applied. 346  Lower courts have
continued to apply the McDonnell Douglas approach to ADEA cases after
Gross, but its application has not been uniform. 347
One district court altered the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas
framework to account for the Court's holding in Gross.348 The district
court held that even after the plaintiffs established a prima facie case of age
discrimination, the burden did not shift to the defendant to articulate a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason because they did not prove that age
was the but-for cause of the adverse decision. 349 This should not be the
effect of the Gross holding. Under McDonnell Douglas, the second prong
of the analysis shifts the burden of production, rather than the burden of
persuasion, to the employer. 350 The Gross Court stated that the burden of
persuasion never shifts;351 therefore, the Gross holding should not affect
the burden of production shift in McDonnell Douglas.3
52
McDonnell Douglas assists disparate treatment plaintiffs because direct
evidence of discrimination is frequently not available. 353 It aids plaintiffs
by forcing employers to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for the
adverse decision so that the plaintiff can disprove the proffered reason or
prove that it is a pretext for discrimination. 354 McDonnell Douglas still
requires but-for causation, but the plaintiff does not have to prove this until
the third stage of the framework. 355
As noted in Part II.D, some district courts have analyzed post-Gross
ADEA cases using the McDonnell Douglas framework, simply stating that
the plaintiffs burden in the third step, after the employer articulates a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, is to prove that age was the but-for
cause of the adverse employment decision. 356 These courts have properly
interpreted Gross and its impact on McDonnell Douglas: after the prima
facie case is rebutted, the plaintiff must prove that age was the "but-for"
cause of the defendant's decision. The McDonnell Douglas framework was
meant to structure and allocate the burden of proof in disparate treatment
346. See supra note 79.
347. See supra Part II.D for cases in which lower courts discussed the Supreme Court's
holding in Gross and its potential impact on whether McDonnell Douglas applies to ADEA
cases.
348. See supra notes 292-99 and accompanying text.
349. See supra notes 292-99 and accompanying text.
350. See supra notes 72, 100 and accompanying text.
351. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2352 (2009); supra note 220 and
accompanying text.
352. Similarly, the district court that analyzed an ADEA claim by, first, using the
McDonnell Douglas framework and, second, without shifting even the burden of production
to the defendant, could have simply analyzed the plaintiff's claim using McDonnell Douglas.
See supra notes 285-91 and accompanying text. As noted above, Gross requires the burden
of persuasion to remain with the plaintiff, and it does remain with the plaintiff when using
McDonnell Douglas. See supra notes 75, 78 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 65, 78.
354. See supra notes 65, 69, 78.
355. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
356. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
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cases so that a plaintiff could prove discrimination "without having to show
that the employer had admitted that it was discriminating. ' 357 It is meant to
assist plaintiffs in presenting their case despite the unavailability of
evidence of discrimination. Employers are certainly no more likely to
openly admit discrimination today than they were in 1973 when McDonnell
Douglas was decided and, therefore, any departure from this established
precedent appears unwarranted.
Since the ultimate burden of proof remains with the plaintiff at all times
when McDonnell Douglas is used, the framework is consistent with Gross.
McDonnell Douglas simply offers a way to ensure an ADEA claimant
"'[has] his day in court despite the unavailability of direct evidence."'' 358
The Gross Court did not decide whether McDonnell Douglas applies to the
ADEA, and therefore lower courts could continue following their circuits'
precedent. 359 Even after the Court held that an ADEA plaintiff must prove
"but-for" causation, the McDonnell Douglas framework can still be used to
prove age discrimination claims. 360
B. The Next Step: Congress Should Amend the ADEA
The Supreme Court in Gross hinted that Congress could step in to amend
the ADEA to permit mixed-motives instructions. 361 The Court viewed the
decision to permit ADEA violations based on "motivating factor" causation
as a choice for Congress, rather than the Court, to make. 362 Congress
should amend the ADEA to be consistent with Title VII, permitting an
ADEA plaintiff to establish a violation where an employer is motivated in
part by age discrimination, limiting the plaintiffs remedies if the employer
proves it would have made the same decision regardless of the plaintiffs
age.
357. See Zimmer, supra note 78, at 1894; see supra note 78.
358. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (alteration in
original) (quoting Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014 (1st Cir. 1979)); supra note
65. The continued application of McDonnell Douglas has been written about extensively.
Professor Prenkert argues that courts cling to McDonnell Douglas because it is a sort of
"security blanket" among the "utter disarray" of disparate treatment law. Prenkert, supra
note 23, at 515-16. In his article, he argues that once disparate treatment law is brought into
"second-order uniformity," McDonnell Douglas can be "put to rest." Id. at 559. Professor
Prenkert argues that "courts and litigants will continue to cling to McDonnell Douglas so
long as they lack a viable, coherent alternative to the McDonnell Douglas framework. For
all its faults and shortcomings, McDonnell Douglas provides uniformity to disparate
treatment law across the various relevant statutes and claims. I call this 'second-order
uniformity."' Id. at 515. If and until Congress acts, McDonnell Douglas can maintain its
position in ADEA disparate treatment law. Without congressional action, ADEA claimants
are no longer entitled to any mixed-motives claims; therefore Professor Prenkert's hope of
second-uniformity across disparate treatment statutes cannot exist.
359. See supra note 283.
360. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text, explaining that McDonnell Douglas
requires a plaintiff to prove "but-for" causation.
361. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 n.3 (2009); see supra notes
227-31 and accompanying text.
362. See supra notes 227-31 and accompanying text.
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1. Interest in Eliminating Age Discrimination in Employment
Age discrimination in employment is becoming increasingly important in
light of the current economic crisis in the United States. 363 The poor
economy is causing more workers to be laid off.364 When older workers
are unemployed, it typically takes longer for them to find new jobs. 365 The
effect of large numbers of unemployed older workers could have a
substantial impact on government resources, and therefore age
discrimination should be deterred and avoided where possible. 366  Of
course, the ADEA permits an employer to make decisions based on
"reasonable factors other than age" or to take an employee's age into
account where age is a "bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of the particular business." 367 However,
deterring arbitrary age discrimination would not prevent employers from
relying on age where the ADEA permits.
Proving discriminatory intent is not easy for plaintiffs. 368 This was the
original reason for shifting the burden of proof to the defendant in Price
Waterhouse369 and for adopting the McDonnell Douglas framework to
permit plaintiffs to prove discrimination based on circumstantial
evidence. 370 Now that the Court has held that the burden of persuasion
never shifts to the defendant in cases brought under the ADEA, reactions to
the Court's holding suggest that it will be even more difficult for plaintiffs
to show the defendant discriminated. 371
Age discrimination may differ from discrimination prohibited in Title VII
because it is not typically based on animus, 372 but this does not mean that
the two causation standards must differ. Although age discrimination is not
necessarily invidious, it is discrimination nonetheless and should be
eradicated from the workplace. Employers should base decisions on an
individual's abilities and qualifications, rather than his age. 373 Amending
the ADEA to include the § 107 causation standard would help to eliminate
age discrimination in the workplace, which is one of the goals of the
ADEA. 374 The fact that age discrimination is not typically animus-based
363. See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
364. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
365. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text.
366. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
367. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2006); see supra notes 29-30, 45 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 94, 279, 311-13 and accompanying text.
369. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
370. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 309-13. It is true employers benefit from Gross because they will
not be liable for decisions motivated in part by discrimination. See supra notes 303-09.
However, this should not outweigh individuals' and society's interest in eradicating
discrimination from the workplace. Parts III.C.2 and III.C.3 outline the best standards of
causation for ADEA plaintiffs to eradicate age discrimination in employment.
372. See supra notes 27, 50 and accompanying text.
373. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
374. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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does not change the benefits of using motivating factor causation for
liability and but-for causation for damages that will be discussed below in
Parts III.C.2 and III.C.3. 37 5
2. "Because of' Should Mean "Motivating Factor" for Liability
The causation standard under the ADEA should be "motivating factor"
for liability and "but-for" for full damages-identical to what Congress
enacted in § 107 of the 1991 Act. The ADEA should not require the
plaintiff to prove "but-for" causation in order to establish a claim under the
ADEA. Professor Martin Katz argues that McDonnell Douglas and Price
Waterhouse require "but-for" causation for claims under the Act and that
there are normative problems with requiring "but-for" causation in
discrimination cases. 376 Even before the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in Gross, Professor Katz argued that § 107's "motivating factor" standard
of causation for liability and "but for" causation for damages should be the
causation standard in all antidiscrimination statutes that use the same
"because of' language as Title VII. 377 Professor Katz argued that courts
should not require a disparate treatment plaintiff to prove but-for causation
for liability because "[a] defendant who engages in 'motivating factor'
375. Professor Prenkert focused on the importance of "second-order uniformity" in
disparate treatment law, advocating for Congress to amend all antidiscrimination statutes to
be consistent with the "motivating factor" framework set out in § 107. Prenkert, supra note
23, at 560-61. Professor Prenkert noted that there may be reasons to have different remedy
limitations between the various antidiscrimination statutes, but he did not identify specific
reasons in his analysis. See id. at 561 n.268.
376. The shortcomings of McDonnell Douglas and Price Waterhouse are outlined in
Professor Martin Katz's article. Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment, supra note 96; see also
supra notes 112, 116.
377. See supra note 116. Professor Katz's article advocates for applying § 107's two-tier
causation standard to all disparate treatment statutes, including the ADEA and the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-17 (2006). Katz, Unifying Disparate
Treatment, supra note 96, at 659-60, 667 n.92. Professor Katz's article proposed a way for
lower courts to implement § 107's causation standards without the need for Supreme Court
or congressional action. Id. at 644. Since the Supreme Court has now ruled that mixed-
motives claims are unavailable under the ADEA, lower courts cannot apply the "motivating
factor" standard of causation in ADEA cases. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct.
2343, 2346 (2009).
Professor Prenkert wrote an article that focused on bringing "second-order uniformity" to
disparate treatment law. See Prenkert, supra note 23; see also supra note 358. Professor
Prenkert advocated for Congress to take action in order to "clean up the mixed-motives
mess" by making § 107's "motivating factor" standard the standard for all disparate
treatment law. Prenkert, supra note 23, at 559-61 (analyzing the varying approaches to
mixed-motives claims before the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Gross). Professor
Prenkert noted two particular ways Congress could amend the antidiscrimination statutes in
order to accomplish the goal of uniformity: (i) amending the statutes to include the same
language as § 107, or (ii) defining "because of" and "based on" in the statutes' definition
sections. Id. at 560. This Note argues that Congress should amend the ADEA to include §
107's motivating factor provision for liability and but-for causation for damages. The reason
this Note advocates to amend the ADEA is to offer protection to victims of age
discrimination, rather than bringing uniformity to disparate treatment law, as Professor
Prenkert emphasizes. See Prenkert, supra note 23.
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discrimination has engaged in wrongdoing." 378 This remains true today
under the ADEA.
The ADEA was enacted to combat age discrimination in the workplace
by deterring employers from discriminating; attaching liability to an
employer who engages in "motivating factor" discrimination would help
achieve this purpose.379 As Professor Katz argues, "but-for" causation for
liability could permit defendants who are motivated in part by
discrimination to escape liability.380 If an employer were not liable for
relying in part on discriminatory motive, the employer would not be
deterred from discriminating in the future. 381 This undermines one of the
purposes of the ADEA. 382 Congress rejected Price Waterhouse because it
permitted defendants motivated by discrimination to escape liability. 383 In
enacting § 107, Congress intended to "restore the rule . . . that any
discrimination that is actually shown to play a role in a contested
employment decision may be the subject of liability. ' 384 Despite the
differences in race and age discrimination, eliminating discriminatory
motives from the workplace should be a common goal. 3 85
When an employer discriminates based on age, it is typically arbitrary
because age discrimination is often based on misconceptions about a
person's productivity because of his age.386 If "motivating factor" was the
standard for liability, employers would be deterred from arbitrary use of age
as a proxy for ability, and therefore this goal of the ADEA would be
fulfilled. 387 There may be instances in which an older employee is not as
effective or productive as a younger employee, but that lack of ability, and
not age, should be the basis for disparate treatment.
Congress should amend the ADEA to permit burden-shifting, mixed-
motives instructions because it provides a better way to combat age
discrimination than "but-for" causation as mandated by the Supreme Court
in Gross. Where an employer relies in part on an employee's age in making
an adverse employment decision, this is discrimination and should be a
violation of the ADEA. 388 Similar to Title VII cases, where an employee
proves an employer was motivated by discrimination, the burden of
persuasion should shift to the employer in ADEA cases to prove that the
employer would have made the same decision regardless of the employee's
378. Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment, supra note 96, at 658; see also supra note 102.
379. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
380. See supra note 102.
381. See supra notes 35-36, 102, 314 and accompanying text.
382. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
383. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
384. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 18 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 711;
see supra note 112 and accompanying text.
385. See supra Part IH.C. I (explaining reasons to eliminate age discrimination).
386. See supra notes 26-28, 35-36 and accompanying text.
387. See supra notes 35-36, 102, 116 and accompanying text; cf supra note 116 and
accompanying text (explaining the shortcomings of § 107's causation standards).
388. Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment, supra note 96, at 658; see also supra note 102.
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age. 389 As discussed in Part III.C.3, if the employer can prove he would
have made the same decision regardless of the plaintiffs age, the remedies
available to the plaintiff should be limited in the same way § 107 limits a
Title VII plaintiffs remedies.
3. "Because of' Should Mean "But-For" for Damages
Congress should amend the ADEA to include the limitation on remedies
for plaintiffs in cases where the defendant proves it would have made the
same decision regardless of the plaintiffs age. This causation standard set
out in the 1991 Act best serves the purposes of the ADEA. 390
In addition to deterring future acts of age discrimination, the ADEA was
designed to compensate victims of age discrimination. 391  "Motivating
factor" causation for liability and "but-for" causation for damages is
consistent with this goal of compensating victims. As Professor Katz points
out, if a plaintiff only had to prove "motivating factor" liability for
damages, then a plaintiff could receive a windfall. 392 If a plaintiff proved
that age was a motivating factor in the employer's adverse decision, but
other reasons also motivated the employer's decision, it is possible for the
plaintiff to be compensated where he would have been terminated
regardless of discrimination. 393 For example, assume a fifty-year-old
plaintiff-employee can prove that an employer fired him for two reasons. 394
First, the employee constantly left work early and, second, the employer
assumed that the employee was less productive because he was
significantly older than his coworkers. In this mixed-motives example, if
the employee received damages because he proved that discrimination was
one of the motivating factors behind the adverse employment decision, this
would be a windfall. 395  The employer had a legitimate reason for
terminating the employee-because the employee constantly left work
early--even though age discrimination also motivated the decision.
"But-for" causation for damages narrowly tailors the statute to fulfill the
ADEA's purpose of eliminating discrimination. 396  By limiting the
remedies a plaintiff can recover where the defendant proves he would have
made the same decision, the focus is on eliminating age discrimination in
the workplace, rather than forcing employers to keep older workers who
should be terminated regardless of their age. 397 If an employer would have
terminated an older employee because his work was unsatisfactory, §
389. See supra Part I.C.3 (outlining § 107 of the 1991 Act).
390. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
391. See supra notes 36, 102, 116 and accompanying text.
392. See supra note 116.
393. See supra note 116.
394. See Professor Katz's article, Unifying Disparate Treatment Law, supra note 96, at
656, which provides a hypothetical of a mixed-motives case in which the defendant was
motivated in part by the employee's race and in part by the employee's excessive tardiness.
395. See id.
396. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
397. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
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107(b) dictates that a court "shall not award damages or issue an order
requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment. '398
Thus, an employer is not forced to employ older workers; rather, it is forced
to make decisions without relying on age as a proxy for an employee's
ability. 399 Eradicating any reliance on age as a proxy for ability is one of
the purposes of the ADEA.400 The remedy limitation means that the
employer is not liable for damages or injunctive relief where he would have
made the same decision regardless of the employee's age.401 Thus, the
employer is not compelled to reinstate or hire, for example, a worker who is
not qualified for the position, but he is liable for attorney's fees if his
decision was partly motivated by discrimination. 40 2
As Professor Katz argues, § 107's "two-tier causal standard" provides a
better causation standard for antidiscrimination statutes than the standards
outlined by the Court in Price Waterhouse and McDonnell Douglas.40 3
CONCLUSION
Congress should amend the ADEA to prohibit employers from making
decisions in which age is a motivating factor. If age is proven to be a
motivating factor in an employer's decision, the burden should shift to the
defendant to prove that he would have made the same decision regardless of
the employee's age; otherwise, he will be liable for damages. While it is
generally understood that age discrimination differs from other types of
discrimination, the main goals of deterring future discriminatory acts and
compensating victims of discrimination support adopting the two-tiered
causal framework. The goals of the ADEA would be fulfilled if Title VII's
causation standard were used for disparate treatment cases; therefore,
Congress should amend the ADEA.
398. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(ii) (2006); see also supra note 116 and accompanying
text.
399. See supra note 11.
400. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
401. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
402. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
403. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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